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1. INTRODUCTION
Jamie Wilson, nineteen years old and severely mentally ill, walked into a
school cafeteria and started shooting. Two children died, and Jamie was
charged with two counts of capital murder. Because he admitted his guilt, the
only issue at his trial was the appropriate punishment. The trial judge assigned
to his case, after hearing expert testimony on his mental state, found that
mental illness rendered Jamie unable to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law at the time of the crime-not impaired by his mental
[Vol. 55: 93
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illness in his ability to control his behavior, but unable to control his behavior.
The following day, the same judge sentenced Jamie to death.'
The most common reaction to Jamie's story, regardless of the death
penalty views of the audience, is "What?" At the very least, it is
counterintuitive to kill someone for behavior he was powerless to avoid.
Whether a practice is unconstitutional, of course, is hardly determined by
whether it is sensible, and the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that,
sensible or not, it is constitutional.2 In so holding, the fact that no other
defendant-in South Carolina or any other state-has ever been sentenced to
death after the factfinder determined that he lacked volitional control did not
sway the court.3
Atkins v. Virginia,4 decided in 2002 by the United States Supreme Court,
casts further doubt on the South Carolina highest court's holding.' Reversing
its 1989 holding in Penry v. Lynaugh,6 the Supreme Court in Atkins held that
the Eighth Amendment's ban on excessive and cruel and unusual punishments
prohibited the execution of individuals with mental retardation.
7 Already, two
state court justices have opined that the rationale of Atkins likewise precludes
the execution of severely mentally ill offenders.' In this Article, we consider
the implications of Atkins for mentally ill defendants, arguing that it does
indeed compel the conclusion that executing a defendant for conduct he was
unable to control is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. On the other hand,
we think that the application of Atkins to other kinds of mentally ill defendants
is less clear, and that much work remains to be done on that front; we begin
that work in this Article.9
1. State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 501, 413 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1992).
2. Id. at 512, 413 S.E.2d at 27.
3. Id. at 516, 413 S.E.2d at 30 (Finney, J., dissenting).
4. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding death penalty unconstitutional for mentally retarded defen-
dants).
5. More recently, three Justices dissented from denial of certiorari in Patterson v. Texas, 536
U.S. 984 (2002), a case raising the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on juveniles.
Justice Ginsburg explained in her dissenting opinion that Atkins makes it "tenable ... to urge
reconsideration of Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)," which upheld the imposition of
the death penalty for crimes committed by sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. Patterson, 536 U.S.
at 985 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (finding that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment does not prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded).
7. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
8. See Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting); State v.
Nelson, 803 A.2d 1, 47 (N.J. 2002) (Zazzali, J., concurring) (applying the reasoning of Atkins to
a severely mentally ill defendant as a matter of state constitutional law); contra State v. Weik, No.
25526, 2002 S.C. LEXIS 159, at *13 (S.C. Sept. 3, 2002) (finding that Atkins has no applicability
to mentally ill offenders), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2580 (2003).
9. As we discuss more fully in Part IV, one other article, Anne S. Emanuel, Guilty but
Mentally Ill Verdicts and the Death Penalty: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 68 N.C. L. REv. 37,
39 (1989), and a note, Van W. Ellis, Note, Guilty but Mentally Ill and the Death Penalty:
Punishment Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing, 43 DUKE L. J. 87, 89 (1993), argue that
the imposition of the death penalty on "guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI) defendants violates the
2003]
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Part I briefly reports on the life of Jamie Wilson and the litigation of his
case. Part II summarizes relevant Eighth Amendment law, focusing on the
Supreme Court's decision in Atkins. Part III applies the Atkins rationale to the
execution of persons whose mental illness rendered them unable to control the
conduct for which they were prosecuted, and Part IV begins to explore the
harder question of what the Eighth Amendment says about the execution of
persons who are able to control their conduct, but who are nonetheless
seriously mentally ill. In so doing, we consider the cases of several other very
mentally ill offenders, as well as several different standards for a categorical
exemption of the mentally ill. In the end, we conclude that the Atkins
methodology carries us further into the ranks of the mentally ill than volitional
incapacitation-but not much.
II. JAMIE WILSON: A "NON-WILLING"' 0 OFFENDER
A. The Defendant
Lest the reader wonder if the trial court's finding inartfully overstated
Jamie's volitional incapacitation, or that Jamie hoodwinked the trial court by
skillful malingering, we will briefly summarize his social history. The
frequency of mental illness in Jamie's family is very high, even for a patient
identified as schizophrenic." For at least four generations back, relatives had
been medicated and hospitalized for mental illness. 2 Given the prevalence of
Eighth Amendment. Both articles predate Atkins, and unlike this article, neither attempts to count
the jurisdictions which preclude execution based upon volitional incapacity, as we think is
required by Atkins (as well as the rest of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
Not surprisingly, our different methodology leads us to different results.
10. By "non-willing" offender, we mean a defendant who, in the words of the South
Carolina statute, "lack[s] sufficient capacity" to control his conduct or to "conform [it] to the
requirements of the law." S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(A) (Law. Co-op. 2003) (emphasis added).
As the South Carolina Supreme Court observed, this formulation is the equivalent of the
"irresistable impulse" test. See State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 504-05, 413 S.E.2d 19, 23 (1992).
We also use the term "volitionally incapacitated" to refer to a such a person.
11. Transcript of Post-Conviction Relief Hearing and Exhibits at 332, Wilson v. Evatt (No.
93-CP-24-037) (S.C. Ct. Com. P1. filed Sept. 24, 1998) [hereinafter PCR Tr.]; Record at 1446,
Wilson (No. 93-CP-24-037).
12. Jamie Wilson's paternal great-grandfather, Edgar Wilson, had a nephew who was
mentally ill and spent fourteen years in a psychiatric institution. PCR Tr., supra note 11, at
251-52. One of Edgar Wilson's daughters married a man who became mentally ill. Id. at 254-55.
Another of his daughters had a mentally ill child, Eva Wright, who has been taking medication for
anxiety symptoms for much of her adult life. Id. at 255. Twymond Wilson, Jamie's grandfather,
also had psychiatric problems. Id. at 257-58. He would become overwhelmed with anxiety about
minor problems and took prescription medication on and off throughout his life. Id. at 259.
Jamie's great-grandmother on his paternal grandmother's side, Lila Watts, had an aunt, Lula
Mullinax, who spent much of her life in the state hospital diagnosed with the disease now referred
to as schizophrenia. Id. at 262. Mullinax's daughter, Etta Davis, had her first psychotic episode
around age twenty-six, when she gave her children away to her neighbors. She was hospitalized,
never to come out. PCR Tr., supra note 11, at 263. Lila Watts, herself, also had emotional
4
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mental illness, it is not surprising that numerous instances of attachment
disruption and emotional abuse or neglect have occurred for several
generations."3
Physical abuse and conflict were also rampant in Jamie's extended family
on both the maternal 4 and paternal sides.
5 Violence was directed at Jamie
himself while he was still a toddler, and in his middle years, his father "would
pull out a gun and threaten to kill him."
6 Moreover, Jamie was physically
abused by his mother and both paternal grandparents.
7
problems. Id. at 264. She was compulsive, depressed, paranoid, and suffered from kinesthetic
hallucinations and a preoccupation with germs. She too was hospitalized, though not until later
in her life. Id. at 264-66.
In the next generation, Lila's daughter, Annie, (Jamie's grandmother's sister) was described
by Jamie's grandmother as being a lot like Jamie. Id. at 267. She had obsessive compulsive
symptoms with psychotic episodes, for which she was hospitalized several times. Id. at 268-69.
On the maternal side, Jamie's great-grandmother, Lilly Minor, "suffered from fairly serious
depression ... [with] episodes of paranoia throughout her life and... hallucinatory experiences."
Id. at 286. One of her daughters, Onie Buford, had a "history of psychiatric problems" that
included many anxiety symptoms and required medication. PCR Tr., supra note 11, at 290.
Another daughter, Alice Swink, (Jamie's grandmother) had a "severe incapacitating depression
for many years," as well as "paranoid ideation" and "odd habits," such as distributing aluminum
foil around the yard. These illnesses required both antipsychotic and antidepressant medications.
Id. at 294.
13. Id. at 253, 255-57, 267-68, 279, 291. For example, Jamie's grandmother Swink had an
extraordinarily anxious, dependent attachment to her mother. This relationship, in which each felt
the other's thoughts and feelings, was so strong that Jamie's grandmother was essentially
uneducated because she did not wish to leave her mother for school. Id. at 291.
14. On his mother's side of the family, Jamie's great-grandfather Swink "was physically
abusive towards his wife and ... children." Id. at 285. Great-grandfather Minor (Jamie's maternal
grandmother's father) was also physically violent. Id. at 286. His son, Riley Swink, (Jamie's
grandmother's brother) and daughter, Onie Buford, (Jamie's grandmother's sister) also had
histories of violence. PCR Tr., supra note 11, at 290.
15. His paternal great-grandfather, Edgar Wilson, was a violent adult with a reputation for
using guns and even lost a leg in a gun accident. He was physically abusive to his blind wife and
to his children. Id. at 252, 256. Edgar Wilson's daughter, Myrtle, who was a particular focus of
his abuse, also had a violent relationship with her husband. Two of her sons have a great deal of
marital conflict and physically abuse their wives, as do two of her grandsons. Id. at 253-54. Edgar
Wilson's son, Twymond Wilson, (Jamie's paternal grandfather) was also a violent man who
"enjoyed using guns" and was known for threatening people with them. He was physically abusive
to his wife and children. Id. at 257-58. The family story was that he was a racist who got in trouble
for having killed a couple of African-Americans. He was a member of the Ku Klux Klan. Id. at
258-59.
On the paternal grandmother's side, Robert Lee Watts (Jamie's other great-grandfather) was
physically violent toward his wife, Lila Watts, and toward their children. Id. at 262. Their
daughters, Marian and Margaret, had violent relationships with their husbands. PCR Tr., supra
note 11, at 270, 273. Jamie's grandmother, Gladys Wilson, was physically abused by her father
and emotionally abused by both of her parents. She was also physically abused by her husband.
Id. at 274-76, 278. Both she and her husband directed a "great deal of physical violence" toward
Jamie's father, Jimmy Wilson. Id. at 278. In one instance, Gladys Wilson banged Jimmy Wilson's
head against the porch wall in an effort to teach him math. Id. at 281-82.
16. Id. at313, 321.
17. Id. at 322.
5
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Drug and alcohol abuse, particularly prescription drug abuse, were also
common on both sides of Jamie's extended family for several generations back.
By the time he was thirteen, Jamie himself was given medication, which had
been prescribed to his grandmother or grandfather, when he became violent or
difficult.'8 Later, when Jamie was prescribed medication for himself, he abused
that as well, and when he ran out of drugs before his prescription could be
refilled, his grandmother helped him get extra medication. "9
The first indication of emotional problems, stuttering, began when Jamie
was about five years old. He also yelled obscenities in church.2" By the age of
eight, he was very anxious about germs and had elaborate rituals for food
preparations.2 He developed extreme bathing compulsions, and by the time he
was thirteen, would not go to church because of a fear that people were staring
at him. He was also physically aggressive toward other children, his mother,
and his grandparents.22 Jamie was paranoid from early adolescence on, and as
he got older, he reversed his days and nights, a common phenomenon with
schizophrenics.23 His obsession with germs continued until age seventeen or
eighteen, when he developed a complete disregard for hygiene. His suicidal
thinking and gestures began at about age thirteen and continued.24 When he
was fourteen, Jamie developed a compulsive spitting habit,25 and by tenth
grade, his school behavior had become extremely bizarre and included clucking
like a chicken in class.26 When Jamie's disturbance began to escalate, his
family sent him to another house or a motel, and then when the problem
became too serious, they attempted to get him hospitalized. They would not,
however, make sure that he went to follow-up appointments or participated in
a day treatment program, even at the age of fourteen.27
Jamie was first hospitalized around age fourteen and was then hospitalized
twice more before the age of sixteen.28 He was hospitalized again at seventeen
and was hospitalized three more times in the next two years, during the course
of which he was diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and paranoia.29
He attempted to admit himself on a later date, but "was denied admission
because he was no longer covered by his father's insurance."3
18. PCR Tr., supra note 11, at 328-29.
19. Id. at 330.
20. Id. at 339-40.
21. Id. at341.
22. Id. at 342-43.
23. Id. at 345-46.
24. PCR Tr., supra note 11, at 346-47.
25. Id. at 376.
26. Id. at 371.
27. Id. at 396-97.
28. Id. at 377-79.
29. Id. at 381-84.
30. PCR Tr., supra note 11, at 386.
[Vol. 55:93
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B. The Crime
The summer before his crime, Jamie slept during the day and refused to let
anyone into the house. He spent his waking time watching television and
staring off into space.3 He was obsessed with books about murder and horror
movies, resumed stuttering, and renewed his obsession with the dark. He
experienced more and more auditory hallucinations. When his grandfather
died, Jamie did not respond with normal grief, and tried to avoid the funeral;
pressed to attend, he wore jeans and alternated between being very out of
contact and being somewhat euphoric.32 Immediately before the crime, a
neighbor murdered his own sister, and Jamie became extremely focused on that
event.33
"On the morning of September 26, 1988, Jamie Wilson drove to his
maternal grandmother's house and stole her .22 caliber, nine-shot revolver.
34
He then drove to a "discount store and purchased some .22 hollow-point long
rifle ammunition," discarded the bullets in the gun, and reloaded the weapon
with the new bullets.35 He drove to the school, found the cafeteria, and "stood
quietly for a moment."36 He "pulled out the pistol and began shooting. '37 He
reloaded the gun in a restroom and emptied his gun a second time in a
classroom. 38 He then crawled out a window, where a teacher told him to stand
with his hands up. He did so until police arrived. He handed the police his
library card. Several people were injured, and two eight-year-old girls were
killed.39
C. The Legal Proceedings
Shortly after Jamie's arrest, he was committed on motion of the prosecutor
to the forensic unit of the South Carolina Department of Mental Health.4'
There, the staff noted that Jamie had a lengthy history of prior psychiatric
commitments and determined that he suffered from a severe and debilitating
form of mental illness, borderline personality disorder. Schizophrenia, the
most debilitating form of mental illness, is commonly misdiagnosed as
borderline personality disorder in the onset period, and there would later be a
consensus that Jamie actually suffers from schizophrenia. Regardless of the
proper diagnostic category, the state mental health professionals were
31. Id. at 387-88.
32. Id. at 392.
33. Id. at 394.
34. State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 500, 413 S.E.2d 19, 20 (1992).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. PCR Tr., supra note 11, at 162.
2003]
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unanimous that Jamie was hearing command hallucinations at the time he
entered the school and that mental illness had deprived Jamie of the ability to
conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. Several viewed the further
question of whether he knew the difference between right and wrong-the
insanity defense formula in South Carolina-as a close one.4 When Jamie
pleaded guilty but mentally ill to all charges, the trial judge convened a hearing
to determine whether the statutory standard for a "guilty but mentally ill"
(GBMI) verdict was met.4"
A short digression on GBMI verdicts may be helpful here. The traditional
legal definition of insanity was formulated in M'Naghten's Case:43 a defendant
is insane (and therefore absolved of criminal responsibility) if, due to a defect
of reason caused by mental illness at the time of the act, he did not "know
[either] the nature and quality of the act" or that the act was wrong." The
Model Penal Code,45 which has been widely adopted by the states (and until
1984,46 by the federal courts of appeal), expands that test in three important
ways. First, it relaxes the term "know" to "appreciate"; second, instead of
requiring a total lack of capacity to appreciate wrongfulness, it requires only
lack of "substantial capacity"; and third, it adds a second, "volitional" prong,
exonerating defendants who lack substantial capacity to control their conduct.47
Not surprisingly, the broadening of the insanity defense led to a backlash.
GBMI verdicts attempt to create a middle ground between guilty verdicts and
insanity acquittals by recognizing the role mental illness played in the offense,
yet insisting that the defendant is nonetheless criminally responsible for the
offense and therefore subject to punishment. In theory at least, the harshness
of supplanting insanity acquittals with guilty verdicts is mitigated by the
guarantee of mental health treatment during the period of incarceration, though
commentators have criticized this promise as illusory.48 GBMI verdicts have,
in fact, been criticized on a number of grounds,49 but it is not our purpose here
41. Id. at 174-76.
42. Wilson, 306 S.C. at 501, 413 S.E.2d at 21.
43. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
44. Id. at 722.
45. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988) (codifying M'Naghten rule).
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 3 (1985).
48. See, e.g., Gare A. Smith & James A. Hall, Project, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty But
Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 77, 79 n. 10 (1982) (arguing
that it is unlikely that Michigan's GMBI convicts actually received this "guaranteed treatment");
Bradley D. McGraw et al., The "Guilty But Mentally Ill " Plea and Verdict: Current State of the
Knowledge, 30 VILL. L. REv. 117, 125-26 (1985) (questioning treatment of GMBI convicts). See
also People v. Carter, 481 N.E.2d 1012, 1020 (111. App. Ct. 1985) ("Although there is no guarantee
that defendant will be treated as the trial court suggested, the fact that defendant was found guilty
but mentally ill does guarantee defendant the benefit of being characterized as in need of treatment
.... .).
49. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 7-6.10 at 357 (1986) (noting that GBMI
verdict is "at best confusing and at worst extremely prejudicial"); Christopher Slobogin, The
Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L.
[Vol. 55: 93
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to explore the merits of GBMI pleas in the abstract, but to focus on those facts
relevant to their interaction with the death penalty.
The GBMI verdict originated in Michigan in 1975 in response to the
release of sixty-four defendants who had been found "not guilty by reason of
insanity" (NGRI), but were subsequently found sane at civil commitment
hearings.50 Two of these defendants committed violent crimes almost as soon
as they were released, and the resulting public outrage triggered the first GBMI
statute. 51 That statute provides that a court may impose any sentence upon a
GBMI defendant it could impose on a defendant found guilty."
The Indiana Legislature enacted the second GBMI statute in 198l," also
in response to a particularly heinous crime in which the insanity defense was
offered.54 Then, in 1982, John Hinckley, who was accused of an assassination
attempt on then-President Ronald Reagan, raised an insanity defense and was
acquitted.55 In two years, dissatisfaction with the Hinckley acquittal led to the
creation of GBMI verdicts in ten additional states, including South Carolina;
sometimes reformulation of the insanity defense to exclude any volitional
prong accompanied the creation of these verdicts.56 All of the GBMI statutes
copied Michigan's model in providing that any sentence lawfully imposed
upon a defendant found guilty may be lawfully imposed upon a defendant
found GBMI."7 Generally, these statutes gave no consideration to the question
REV. 494, 497 (1985) (suggesting GMBI verdict does not meet stated goals); Mark A.
Woodmansee, Comment, The Guilty But Mentally IIl Verdict: Political Expediency at the Expense
of Moral Principle, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 341, 372-73 (1996) ("If it does
not suggest a reduced level of culpability. . . , then the GBMI verdict is no different from a simple
guilty verdict, and the designation of 'guilty but mentally ill' is superfluous."); see also Rene J.
LeBlanc-Alhman, Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Poor Prognosis, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1095,
1101 (1998) (arguing that under South Carolina's narrow definition of insanity, GBMI verdict
could not serve function of providing gradations in culpability).
50. Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both
Succeeded in Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity
Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 973 (1987) (detailing facts leading to Michigan's adoption of
GBMI statute).
51. Id. at 973-74.
52. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (West 1982).
53. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36 (Michie 1984).
54. See Scott A. Kinsey, Note, Indiana's Guilty But Mentally Ill Statute: Blueprint to Be-
guile the Jury, 57 IND. L.J. 639, 639 n.4 (1982).
55. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Hinkley Cleared but is Held Insane in Reagan Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1982, at Al.
56. Emanuel, supra note 9, at 42 n.33.
57. Id. at 47.
2003]
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of whether this rule also applied to death sentences, 8 an issue that could not
have arisen in Michigan, given its longstanding abolitionist stance. 9
Though the label is the same, and the sentencing provisions are the same,
the GBMI formulations differed wildly, with some requiring only an impaired
capacity to control conduct, and others phrasing their standard in terms that do
not match any previous insanity standard and indeed, make no reference to
volitional control.6 Among the death penalty states, only the South Carolina
and Delaware statutes clearly require a finding that the accused, because of
mental disease or defect, "lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law."'" Despite that apparent clarity, the Delaware
Supreme Court has construed its GBMI statute to require only a finding that the
defendant's "volitional capacity was impaired by mental illness."62 The
Pennsylvania statute seems to walk the line between requiring impaired
capacity and insufficient capacity, requiring that the defendant, by reason of
mental illness, lacked "substantial capacity either to appreciate wrongfulness
... or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."63 Thus, the
particular question posed to the judge assigned to Jamie's case-whether Jamie
lacked sufficient capacity to control his conduct-would only be posed in a
GBMI proceeding in South Carolina (and possibly Pennsylvania, depending on
how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interprets that phrase).
Jamie's defense called four mental health professionals, including the chief
state psychiatrist, Dr. Donald Morgan, and chief state psychologist, Dr. McKee,
both of whom testified that Jamie Wilson's crime occurred during a transient
psychotic episode in which he lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to
58. The possible exception is Georgia, whose GBMI statute when enacted included mentally
retarded individuals within the umbrella of "mentally ill." Later, it passed legislation forbidding
the execution of mentally retarded individuals, but did not forbid the execution of other GBMI
defendants, thereby implying that those defendants could be executed. See Emanuel, supra note
9, at 48-49. Nonetheless, the Georgia Supreme Court has twice stated that the question of whether
defendants found GBMI can be executed is an open one. See Ward v. State, 417 S.E.2d 130, 136
(Ga. 1992) (noting explicitly that the question is undecided); Spraggins v. State, 364 S.E.2d 861,
863-64 n.2 (Ga. 1988) (same).
59. Michigan abolished the death penalty for all crimes except treason in 1846, see
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDAN HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA
28 (1986), and completely abolished it by constitutional amendment in 1963, MICH. CONST. of
1963, art. IV, § 46.
60. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (a)(2) (1997) (defining "mentally ill" as a disorder
that "significantly impairs" judgment, behavior, perception, or control); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 516-2(d) (West 2002) (defining "mentally ill" as "a substantial disorder of thought, mood,
or behavior"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314(a) (West 1998) (defining "mentally ill" as one who
lacks "substantial capacity" to appreciate wrongfulness or to conform conduct to the requirements
of law); 14 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(24) (Michie 1998) (defining "mental illness" as a
"substantial psychiatric disorder" that "impairs a person's judgment").
61. S.C. CODE ANN. §17-24-20(A) (Law. Co-op. 2003) (emphasis added); see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401 (1974).
62. Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 135 (Del. 1991) (emphasis added). See also id. at 125
n.6 ("[A]ny significant volitional impairment is included with the scope of [the GBMI statute].").
63. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314(a).
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the requirements of law.64 The state disputed this conclusion through the
testimony of lay witnesses and the expert testimony of Dr. Park Dietz. Dr.
Dietz, a notoriously pro-prosecution psychiatrist65 who formed his conclusion
without even examining Jamie, agreed with the state hospital's experts that he
suffered from borderline personality disorder and that it was possible that he
had suffered a transient psychotic episode at the time of the offense, but
concluded nonetheless that he "retained sufficient capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law."66
After considering all of the psychiatric and lay testimony, the trial judge
announced that he would accept Jamie's plea of guilty but mentally ill.
67
Notwithstanding this determination, the next day, the trial judge sentenced him
to death.68 Confusion about the meaning or narrow scope of the GBMI verdict
is not the explanation: immediately prior to imposing that sentence, the judge
stated on the record that he had found the defendant mentally ill as defined by
the GBMI statute, reiterating that
[t]he Court found that the defendant at the time of the
commission of the acts constituting the offenses had the
capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to recognize his
acts as being wrong, .. . but, because of mental disease, or
defect, he lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law.6 9
64. During the state post-conviction proceedings, Dr. Morgan testified that, after listening
to the witnesses to the shooting testify at the GBMI hearing, he modified his opinion and
concluded that Mr. Wilson was legally insane under South Carolina's M'Naghten standard. PCR
Tr., supra note 11, at 174-76.
65. Dr. Dietz is on retainer for the FBI. The most recent flurry of notoriety came when he
testified at the Andrea Yates trial that she was not insane when she drowned her five children, and
proceeded to explain that a recent Law and Order television program had featured a mother who
drowned her children and got away with it, a program that likely inspired Yates to believe she
could escape her unglamourous life by the same route. The prosecutor used his testimony in
summation, but as was revealed shortly after the guilty verdict, there had been no such program.
Carol Christian, Psychiatrist Worth $50,000?, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 30, 2002, at 41; "Law and
Order" Saved Yates, N.Y. POST, Mar. 22, 2002, at 6.
66. PCR Tr., supra note 11, at 767.
67. State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 501, 413 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1992).
68. Id.
69. Transcript of Guilty Plea and Sentencing Proceedings at 892, Wilson v. Evatt (No. 93-
CP-24-037) (S.C. Ct. Com. P1. filed Sept. 24, 1998); Record at 892, Wilson, (No. 93-CP-24-037)
(emphasis added).
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III. THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
A. General Principles Determining Whether a Punishment Is Cruel and
Unusual
"The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment is
directed, in part, against all punishments which by their excessive length or
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged."7 To determine
whether a given punishment is disproportional, "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society,"71 as well as the standards that
prevailed at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, must be considered.72 In
establishing what these evolving standards are, the Supreme Court has turned
first to the popular will as expressed in the legislative enactments of the
people's elected representatives,73 but has noted that another "significant and
reliable objective index of contemporary values" regarding the propriety of a
given punishment is the sentencing behavior of juries.74 While less important
in the Court's calculus, even prior to Atkins public opinion had a role to play
in the additional light it sometimes shed on contemporary societal norms
regarding criminal punishments.7"
The Eighth Amendment tests all punishments for their congruence with
evolving standards of decency, but capital sentences, because of their
extremity, require more.76 A capital sentence is also violative of the Eighth
Amendment when it is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime"77
or "so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous
infliction of suffering."7" In Gregg v. Georgia,79 the Supreme Court identified
retribution and deterrence as the two principal social functions that the death
penalty purports to serve, 0 and held in Enmund v. Florida8 that "[u]nless the
death penalty when applied to those in [the defendant's] position measurably
contributes to one or both of these goals, it 'is nothing more than the
70. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).
71. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion), quoted in Stanford v. Ken-
tucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989).
72. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).
73. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788-93; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
593-96 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976).
74. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181, quoted in Coker, 433 U.S. at 596.
75. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334-35 (1989) (noting poll data reflecting oppo-
sition to the execution of mentally retarded defendants, but finding it, standing alone, insufficient
evidence of consensus).
76. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (explaining that "the penalty of
death is qualitatively different").
77. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
78. Id. at 183.
79. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
80. Id. at 183.
81. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and hence an
unconstitutional punishment."82
B. The Application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in
Atkins v. Virginia
The rationale of Atkins v. Virginia8 3 makes easier work of any evaluation
of the constitutional legitimacy of executing a person so mentally impaired that
he lacks the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. In
1989, in Penry v. Lynaugh, a majority of the Court found no sufficient national
consensus barring the death penalty for retarded persons, 4 but as a result of the
"dramatic shift in the state legislative landscape" that occurred after Penry, the
Court decided to revisit the issue."5 The Court first granted certiorari in
McCarver v. North Carolina6 and then replaced McCarver with Atkins.87
The Atkins Court began by establishing that a fundamental "precept of
justice [is] that 'punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned
to [the] offense."'88 This proportionality concept is-and was even before
Atkins -an integral part of any Eighth Amendment analysis.89 The Court also
made clear that determining whether a punishment is constitutionally excessive
or cruel and unusual9" is judged by current standards, not by those which
existed at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified.91 The core Eighth
Amendment concept is the "dignity of man" and thus its constitutional content
must be informed by "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."92 The "evolving standard," the Court again reiterated,
"should be informed by 'objective factors to the maximum possible extent'" ;93
hence, the most reliable evidence of this standard is found in state legislative
enactments and jury verdicts. However, despite the importance of the objective
evidence, the Court was adamant that "in the end [its] own judgment will be
82. Id. at 798 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
83. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding death penalty unconstitutional for mentally retarded defen-
dants).
84. 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
85. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
86. 533 U.S. 975 (2001).
87. Id. McCarver became moot due to the passage of legislation in North Carolina prohi-
biting the execution of persons with mental retardation.
88. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
89. Id.
90. The Court was clear that the Eighth Amendment prohibits "all excessive punishments,
as well as cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive." Id. at 311 n.7.
91. Id. at 311.
92. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
93. Id. at 312 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991)).
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brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under
the Eighth Amendment."94
Its course set, the Court first reviewed the lay of the legislative land. The
Court seemed greatly impressed with the fact that at the time of Penry only two
death penalty states and the federal government proscribed the death penalty
for mentally retarded offenders, but that since Penry, an additional sixteen
states had taken death off the punishment table for the mentally retarded."
Moreover, the Court noted, "i[t] is not so much the number of these States that
is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change."96 These
enactments, "[g]iven the well-known... [popularity of] anticrime legislation,"
provided the Court with "powerful evidence that today our society views
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average
criminal."97 In its successful search for a national consensus, the Court relied
heavily upon the fact that the legislatures passing the laws "voted
overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition."" The Court also looked to the
opinions of social and professional organizations with "germane expertise, 99
the opposition to the practice by "widely diverse religious communities,""'
international practice,'' and polling data.' 2 While not dispositive, these factors
gave further support to the Court's opinion that there was a consensus opposing
the practice "among those who have addressed the issue."'0 3 Finally, the Court
also noted that even in those states that retained the death penalty for the
retarded, only five had actually carried out the execution of a mentally retarded
individual since Penry."'0 Since "[t]he practice ... has become truly unusual,
... it is fair to say," according to the Court, "that a national consensus has
developed against it.'1
05
94. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
597 (1977)).
95. Id. at 314-15.
96. Id. at 315.
97. Id. at 315-16.
98. Id.
99. For example, the American Psychological Association. Id. at 316 n.21.
100. The Court noted that representatives of Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist organ-
izations believed that "the execution of persons with mental retardation cannot be morally
justified." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae
United States Catholic Conference et al.).
101. "[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes commit-
ted by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." Id. at 317 n.21 (quoting Brief
of Amicus Curiae European Union). The significance of international practice in interpreting
constitutional norms was reaffirmed in 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003)
(noting that the European Court of Human Rights, as well as other nations, protects the right of
homosexual adults to engage in intimate sexual conduct).
102. "[P]olling data shows a widespread consensus among Americans, even those who sup-
port the death penalty, that executing the mentally retarded is wrong." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317
n.21.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 316.
105. Id.
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The Court then examined the underlying merits of the consensus,
beginning with the observation that it reflected a "judgment about the relative
culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship between mental
retardation and the penological purposes served by the death penalty,"'
6 a
judgment the Court itself ultimately endorsed. The Court noted that due to their
impairments those with mental retardation "have diminished capacities to
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes
and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses,
and to understand the reactions of others."
107 These deficiencies, while not
justifying an exemption from criminal liability, do diminish the personal
culpability of retarded individuals to the extent that neither of the justifications
advanced by states in support of the death penalty-retribution and
deterrence-would be served by permitting their execution."
0 8
Retribution in the capital context has been limited to "ensur[ing] that only
the most deserving of execution are put to death."'
0 9 Since "just deserts...
necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender," the Court found that the
most extreme punishment was excessive due to the "lesser culpability of the
mentally retarded offender."" 0 The Court also concluded that deterrence
interests are not served by the execution of offenders with mental retardation,
reasoning that "capital punishment can [only] serve as a deterrent when [a
crime] is the result of premeditation and deliberation,""' i.e., when the threat
of death "will inhibit criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct,"
'" 2
but that this type "of calculus is at the opposite end of the spectrum from [the]
behavior of [the] mentally retarded" due to their cognitive and behavioral
impairments."'
In addition to its conclusion that retaining the death penalty for the
mentally retarded would not further legitimate interests in retribution or
deterrence, the Court also found that "[t]he reduced capacity of mentally
retarded offenders provides a second justification for a categorical rule making
such offenders ineligible for the death penalty.""
' 4 Due to their impairments,
there were a host of reasons, including the increased risk of false confessions,
the likelihood of difficulties in communicating with counsel, and a lesser
ability (due to limited communication skill) to effectively testify on their own
behalf, that "in the aggregate" rendered retarded offenders subject to an
106. Id. at 317.
107. Id. at318.
108. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20 (2002).
109. Id. at319.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 320.
113. Id. at 319-20. The Court also concluded that exempting the retarded would not dimi-
nish any other deterrent interests associated with the death penalty because those without mental
retardation are "unprotected by the exemption." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319-20 (2002).
114. Id. at 320.
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unacceptable "risk of wrongful execution.".. 5 The Court also noted the
particular danger that a mentally retarded person's "demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes" which could
enhance the likelihood that the jury will impose the death penalty due to a
belief that they pose a future danger." 6
Thus, the Court concluded that its "independent evaluation of the issue
reveals no reason to disagree with the judgment of the legislatures that have...
concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded
criminal,"' 7and therefore, the Constitution "'places a substantive restriction on
the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender."" 8
IV. APPLYING ATKINSTO NON-WILLING OFFENDERS
Atkins"' provides specific directions for calibrating the Eighth Amendment
standard against which we evaluate whether it is excessive or cruel and unusual
to execute a person who, due to his mental illness, lacks the capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. First, we must look to the
objective evidence of the acceptance of the practice expressed in state
legislative enactments, jury verdicts, 20 and by others who have closely
examined the issue. Second, we need to analyze the moral culpability of those
who cannot conform their conduct due to mental illness, and third, the related
question of whether the execution of such offenders will further any legitimate
retributive or deterrent interest. Finally, Atkins requires that we also investigate
whether, due to the severity of the mental illness, there is a heightened risk of
wrongful execution. Application of this framework to Jamie Wilson's death
sentence, imposed for a crime he lacked the capacity to avoid, compels the
modest conclusion that his sentence is an unconstitutional punishment; we
leave what broader implications Atkins holds for other mentally ill offenders
to Part IV.
115. Id. at 320-21.
116. Id. at321.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
119. Since Atkins, the Supreme Court has decided two Eighth Amendment cases, Lockyer
v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003), and Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2 003). Neither case
is a capital case, however, and neither calls into question the cruel and unusual punishment clause
analysis employed in Atkins.
120. Even the three dissenting Justices agreed that the relevant Eighth Amendment inquiry
must take into account the "work product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations" in
ascertaining "contemporary American conceptions of decency for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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A. Evolving Standards ofDecency Prohibit the Execution of a Person for
Conduct He Was Unable to Control
1. Legislative Enactments and Judicial Interpretations of Those
Enactments
The South Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial judge's
acceptance of Jamie Wilson's GBMI plea established an "unreviewable fact
that he was unable to control his behavior on [the day of the crime]."12' As that
court noted, the pertinent question in answering whether a national consensus
exists that would prohibit such a defendant's execution is not answered by
comparing how many jurisdictions with GBMI statutes have authorized the
imposition of the death penalty for persons who fall within their definition of
"guilty but mentally ill" with the number of jurisdictions with GBMI statutes
that do not authorize the imposition of the death penalty on GBMI defendants.
Such a comparison confounds at least four issues: (1) which jurisdictions have
a death penalty; (2) what the definition of GBMI in that jurisdiction covers; (3)
how GBMI defendants are sentenced in comparison to other defendants; and
(4) whether that jurisdiction has explicitly authorized, prohibited, or failed to
mention death sentences for GBMI defendants. Focus on GBMI states also
ignores the possibility that some jurisdictions without GBMI statutes regulate
the disposition of defendants who are unable to control their conduct through
other statutes or forms of appellate review.
Instead of focusing on the states which coincidentally treat some mentally
ill offenders under the same nominal rubric as does South Carolina, the proper
question is how many states preclude death sentences for defendants who
"lacked sufficient capacity to conform [their] conduct to the requirements of
the law. 122
a. States Whose Laws Preclude the Execution of Volitionally
Incapacitated Offenders
In seventeen states, the trial court's fact finding concerning Jamie's
volitional capacity would have shielded him from all criminal responsibility
and all punishment.123 Of the seventeen states that have a volitional prong as
121. Wilson v. State, 306 S.C. 498, 505,413 S.E.2d 19, 23 (1992). The trial court found that
"because of mental disease, or defect, [Jamie Wilson] lacked sufficient capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law," Transcript of Guilty Plea and Sentencing Proceedings at
892, Wilson v. Evatt (No. 93-CP-24-037) (S.C. Ct. Com. P1. filed Sept. 24, 1998); Record at 892,
Wilson (No. 93-CP-24-037) (emphasis added), and that finding has not been disputed by the state
in subsequent proceedings.
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(A) (Law. Co-op. 2003).
123. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (Michie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13
(West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-400 (Michie 1999);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.020 (Michie 1999); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 12-108
2003]
17
Blume and Johnson: Killing the Non-Willing: Atkins, the Volitionally Incapacitated a
Published by Scholar Commons, 2003
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
part of their insanity defense, seven do not presently have a death penalty.'24
Nevertheless, they contribute equally to the legislative consensus that the death
penalty may not be imposed based upon conduct the defendant was powerless
to avoid. It is not their prohibition of the death penalty but their recognition of
the radically lesser culpability of nonvolitional actors that contributes to this
consensus.' If any of these seven states were to enact a death penalty
tomorrow, persons who were volitionally incapacitated would be ineligible for
death sentencing for precisely the same reason they are presently ineligible in
the ten volitional prong death penalty states: because such persons are deemed
undeserving of any criminal sanction at all.
In another state, Montana, a barrier closely related to the volitional prong
of the insanity defense would preclude execution of a person unable to avoid
his criminal act. Although Montana allows mental illness to excuse criminal
conduct only when it is proven that the defendant did not have the requisite
mental state,'26 the existence of a "mental disease or defect [at the time of the
offense) that rendered the defendant unable.., to conform the defendant's
behavior to the requirements of law"'27 affects the sentencing of that defendant.
Upon a finding that the defendant lacked the ability to conform his conduct,
the court shall sentence the defendant to be committed to the
custody of the director of the department of public health and
human services to be placed... in an appropriate [institution]
for custody, care, and treatment for a definite period of time
not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment that could
(2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.21 a (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295 (2001); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (West 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-
11-304 (Michie 2003); Commonwealth v. McHoul, 226 N.E.2d 556 (Mass. 1967); State v.
Cegelis, 638 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1994); State v. White, 270 P.2d 727 (N.M. 1954); State v. Johnson,
399 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1979); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 70 S.E.2d 284 (Va. 1952); State v.
Myers, 222 S.E.2d 300 (W.Va. 1976), overruled on other grounds, 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).
124. These states include Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra Chart I, at p. 114.
125. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), is not to the contrary. Stanford found that
abolitionist states reveal nothing about the proportionality of executing sixteen- and seventeen-
year- olds. Id. at 370 n.2. But the reason that abolitionist states are not probative is that nothing
in their treatment of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds demonstrates a view that they are
substantially less morally culpable, or that they would be shielded from imposition of the death
penalty were it enacted in such a state. If, contrary to fact, one of those states had laws that
rendered juveniles of those ages ineligible for treatment as adult offenders, such laws would
indeed be probative regarding a consensus of the appropriateness of the death penalty for
juveniles; because none of them had such laws, their abolitionist stand reflected only a view on
the death penalty and not a view on whether juveniles were peculiarly inappropriate candidates
for it.
126. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (2001).
127. Id. § 46-14-311.
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be imposed [upon a finding that the defendant did not suffer
from such a mental disease or defect]."'
Thus, in Montana as well as in the seventeen volitional prong states, no
criminal punishment may be imposed on a person who lacked the capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
In addition to the eighteen states in which persons who are unable to
control their conduct are totally excused from criminal punishment, in at least
one more state such defendants are ineligible for a death sentence because their
volitional incapacity would provide an affirmative defense that mitigates
murder to manslaughter. In New York, it is an affirmative defense to murder
if"[t]he defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of
which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's
situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be."'
29
Defendants who are unable to control their conduct would, by virtue of that
impairment, be under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.
3
Therefore, the total number of states who have made a judgment that
volitionally incapacitated offenders are categorically ineligible for the death
penalty is nineteen-one more than the eighteen the Court found sufficient for
the evolving standard of decency in Atkins.
In at least six additional states-Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi,
Ohio and Nevada-proportionality review has served to remove many mentally
ill offenders (where the existence of serious mental illness is not disputed) from
the ranks of the condemned despite the apparent availability of capital
punishment in such cases.'' While these proportionality decisions do not
128. Id. § 46-14-312.
129. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(2)(a) (McKinney 1998).
130. In states such as Delaware and Montana, a similar extreme emotional disturbance
formula would often result in the mitigation of murder to manslaughter for volitionally impaired
defendants, but might not always do so because those states require that the reasonableness of the
explanation for the disturbance be judged by "a reasonable person in the accused's situation," thus
precluding reliance upon the illness itself to form part of the explanation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 641 (2001) (emphasis added); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103 (2001). Because New
York requires that the disturbance be judged from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's
situation under the circumstances the defendant perceives, the defendant's "situation" would
include his mental illness, and his resultant incapacity to control his conduct would provide the
only required explanation for his emotional disturbance.
131. See, e.g., State v. Fierro, 804 P.2d 72, 90 (Ariz. 1990) (holding death penalty to be
disproportionate due in part to defendant's "history of psychological illness"); State v. Jimenez,
799 P.2d 785, 797-801 (Ariz. 1990) (reducing death sentence to life imprisonment based on
defendant's mental incapacity); State v. Doss, 568 P.2d 1054, 1061 (Ariz. 1977) (same); Besaraba
v. State, 656 So. 2d 441, 447 (Fla. 1995) (overturning death sentence where defendant was under
the influence of great emotional disturbance); Knowles v. State, 632 So. 2d 62, 67 (Fla. 1993)
(finding mitigating factors of defendant's mental illness, including his impaired capacity to control
his conduct, outweighed aggravating factors); Huckaby v. State, 343 So. 2d 29, 33-34 (Fla. 1977)
(finding evidence of mental illness outweighed evidence in aggravation and required reduction of
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correspond precisely to the so-called "irresistible impulse" category at issue
here, they sweep in offenders less impaired than Jamie, and help explain why
these state courts may not have had to face squarely the issue of the
permissibility of death sentences for conduct the defendant was incapable of
controlling. Moreover, the fact that these jurisdictions have used
proportionality review to strike down sentences of mentally ill offenders whose
illness has left them with some capacity to control their conduct suggests that
they might well adopt a per se rule prohibiting the execution of offenders
totally lacking in that capacity if such an offender were in fact sentenced to
death in that jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that states without a death
penalty contribute any information to the question of evolving consensus on
the eligibility of particular classes of offenders.' Nonetheless, it is worth
noting that in addition to the twenty-five states in which the volitionally
incapacitated in particular would likely be exempted from the death penalty,
in five more states such a person could not face the death penalty because there
is no death penalty to face.'33 Chart 1 summarizes the thirty states whose laws
preclude the execution of volitionally incapacitated persons, giving the reasons
for ineligibility so that the reader may grant whatever weight to the absence of
a death penalty, or the probable ineligibility due to proportionality review, as
he or she deems appropriate:
sentence from death to life imprisonment; "while [defendant] may have comprehended the
difference between right and wrong his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and
to conform it to the law was substantially impaired."); Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla.
1977) (same); Jones v. State, 332 So. 2d 615, 619 (Fla. 1976) (reducing death sentence to life
based on evidence of defendant's mental illness); Evans v. State, 598 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind. 1992)
(finding where defendant produced uncontradicted evidence of psychiatric disorder and parental
neglect, death penalty inappropriate despite aggravated nature of crime and defendant's prior
violent history); Edwards v. State, 441 So. 2d 84, 92-94 (Miss. 1983) (plurality opinion) (vacating
death sentence based on offender's mental illness); Haynes v. State, 739 P.2d 497, 503 (Nev.
1987) (vacating as disproportionate death sentence imposed on mentally ill offender); State v.
Claytor, 574 N.E.2d 472, 482 (Ohio 1991) (finding where defendant produced unrebutted
evidence that he lacked substantial capacity to conform, impact of that mitigating factor should
have been given more weight and a life sentence imposed).
132. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.2 (1989) (holding that abolitionist states
reveal nothing about the proportionality of executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds).
133. These states include Alaska, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, and North Dakota. See infra
Chart 1, atp. 113-14.
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Chart I
Reasons for Death Penalty Ineligibility of Defendants with "Insufficient
Capacity" to Control their Conduct
State Insanity Extreme Statutory Propor- No
defense emotional provi- tionality death
with distur- sion review penalty
voli- bance limits removes
tional mitigates punish- severely
prong murder to ment to mentally ill
man- impri- offenders
slaughter sonment
Alaska X
Arizona X
Arkansas X
Connecticut X
Florida X
Georgia X
Hawaii X X
Indiana X
Iowa X
Kentucky X
Maine X
Maryland X
Massachusetts X X
Michigan X X
Minnesota X
Mississippi X
Montana X
Nevada
New
Hampshire
X
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State Insanity Extreme Statutory Propor- No
defense emotional provi- tionality death
with distur- sion review penalty
voli- bance limits removes
tional mitigates punish- severely
prong murder to ment to mentally ill
man- impri- offenders
slaughter sonment
New Mexico X
New York X
North Dakota X
Ohio X
Oregon X
Rhode Island X X
Vermont X X
Virginia X
West Virginia X X
Wisconsin X X
Wyoming X
TOTAL:30 17 1 1 6 12
b. States that Permit Execution of Volitionally Incapacitated
Defendants
Thus, nineteen states have statutes that explicitly preclude execution of a
defendant for conduct he was incapable of controlling, and an additional five
have judicial decisions that raise a strong inference that volitionally
incapacitated offenders are ineligible for execution. In contrast, only South
Carolina law affirmatively sanctions execution of a defendant for conduct he
was unable to control.1
34
134. See Wilson v. State, 306 S.C. 498, 413 S.E.2d 19 (1992).
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c. The Silent States
Although eight other death penalty states have GBMI statutes that on first
glance would seem to include volitionally incapacitated defendants, three of
them in fact would exonerate volitionally incapacitated defendants through
their insanity defenses, 131 and the remaining five have not yet determined the
question. Three states have upheld death sentences in GBMI cases, but none
of these cases involved defendants that lacked sufficient capacity to control
their conduct."3 6 Although the Delaware statute on its face appears to allow an
offender to be found GBMI only if he wholly lacked the capacity to control his
conduct, and the Delaware Supreme Court has held that a GBMI verdict does
not preclude a death sentence, it did so (1) in the course of reversing that
defendant's sentence on another ground, and (2) only after construing the
GBMI verdict to require only a finding that the defendant's "volitional capacity
was impaired by mental illness.' ' 137 In explaining why the legislature deemed
punishment as well as treatment appropriate for GBMI defendants, the court
explained that "an individual whose willpower was undermined by disease...
might, in theory at least, have resisted the urge to commit the crime of which
he has been convicted."' This reasoning, of course, could not be used to
uphold Jamie Wilson's sentence because the GBMI finding made by the judge
foreclosed the possibility that Jamie could have resisted his urge. Reiterating
that a GBMI verdict is not inconsistent with the possibility that the defendant
"might . . . have resisted his pathological impulses,"'39 the Sanders court
explicitly reserved the question of whether a person who, as a result of mental
illness, had "insufficient willpower to choose whether or not he would commit
the crime with which he was charged" could be executed for that crime."4
In Illinois, a GBMI defendant has been held to be eligible for the death
penalty, but because the insanity defense in effect at that time had a volitional
prong, by virtue of being found sane the defendant had been determined to be
"able to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."'' Indeed, the court
cited this finding on insanity as the reason for finding that "deterrence and
retribution remain valid considerations in his punishment."' 42 Illinois no longer
has a volitional prong to its insanity defense, but the Illinois courts have yet to
135. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2 (1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.020 (Michie 1999); State
v. White, 270 P.2d 727, 731 (N.M. 1954) (adopting M'Naghten Rule).
136. These include Delaware, Illinois, and Indiana.
137. Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 135 (Del. 1990) (emphasis added). See also id. at 125
n.6 ("[A]ny significant volitional impairment is included within the scope of [the GBMI
statute].").
138. Id. at 126.
139. Id. at 134.
140. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
141. People v. Crews, 522 N.E.2d 1167, 1174 (1l. 1988).
142. Id.
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rule upon the death eligibility of GBMI defendants under its new insanity
defense.
Indiana has affirmed the death sentence of a GBMI defendant, but there
was no indication that the defendant lacked the ability to control his conduct. 143
In Indiana, a GBMI finding implies nothing about volitional capacity, requiring
proof only that the defendant suffered from "a psychiatric disorder which
substantially disturbs a person's thinking, feeling, or behavior and impairs the
person's ability to function."1'" Moreover, as mentioned previously, the Indiana
Supreme Court has used proportionality review at least once to reverse the
death sentence of a mentally ill offender who was not even psychotic,
suggesting that, a fortiori, a more severe mental illness would also render a
death sentence inappropriate. 145
Of the remaining GBMI states, 1" South Dakota and Pennsylvania have yet
to rule on whether a GBMI defendant is eligible for the death sentence. But, to
the best of our knowledge, no person found GBMI has been sentenced to death
in either of these states.
If we look to the death penalty states without GBMI statutes (and, of
course, without volitional prongs to their insanity defenses), none has held, said
in dicta, or even suggested, that the death penalty may be applied to offenders
who lack sufficient capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of
law. In the five such states with very small death row populations-Colorado,
Kansas, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Washington-the dearth of death penalty
cases means that no valid inferences can be drawn about the views of
sentencing juries or the interpretation of state law that would be made on this
issue. There remain three such states-California, Idaho, and
Louisiana-which have imposed and affirmed relatively large numbers of
death sentences, and which have neither any formal method of determining
whether mentally ill defendants meet the "irresistible impulse" test nor a record
of reversing death sentences of mentally ill offenders on proportionality
grounds. But even these jurisdictions do not reflect, for Eighth Amendment
purposes, any "considered judgment approving the imposition of capital
punishment"'47 on mentally ill offenders who were unable to conform their
conduct. Rather, like the states' laws governing waiver of juvenile offenders
for trial as adults which were considered in Thompson, the states' substantive
143. Harris v. State, 499 N.E.2d 723, 726 (Ind. 1987).
144. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-1-1, 35-36-2-3 (Michie 1998).
145. See Evans v. State, 598 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind. 1992). The Court's decision in Evans
was made in the context of an aggravated crime involving a defendant with a history of sexual
assault, burglary, and child molestation. Id.
146. Nevada was one of the original GBMI death penalty states, but its supreme court has
held that the GBMI statute is unconstitutional. Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84-85 (Nev. 2001).
Georgia does have a GBMI statute, and has explicitly reserved the question of whether GBMI
defendants are death-eligible, see Ward v. State, 417 S.E.2d 130,136 (Ga. 1992); Spraggins v.
State, 364 S.E.2d 861, 863 n.2 (Ga. 1988), but because it has a volitional prong to its insanity
defense, a defendant without sufficient capacity to control his conduct would not be found GBMI.
147. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 852 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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insanity standards reflect a myriad of legislative considerations far more
pressing than their theoretical effect on eligibility for capital punishment. 4 A
state's decision to reject or abandon use of the capacity-to-conform prong of
criminal responsibility simply does not constitute reliable evidence of a
legislative or public attitude in favor of using the death penalty in such cases. '49
In the absence of actual death sentences and executions of volitionally
incapacitated offenders, the lack of legislative or judicial preclusion of such
sentences is similarly ambiguous; silence under these circumstances signifies
neither approval nor disapproval.
Moreover, even these states have not been entirely silent on the issue; all
three recognize impaired capacity to conform conduct to legal requirements as
a statutory mitigating factor. 50 One plausible inference from these statutory
mitigation schemes is that legislators anticipated that in those rare cases where.
the defendant possesses insufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the law,
juries instructed on the mitigating significance of impaired capacity will not
impose the death penalty. While this is not the only possible inference from the
overall statutory schemes, it is at least as likely as the silence-equals-approval
inference. Indeed, as discussed below in Part IV.A.1, if legislators have as-
sumed that juries will give life sentences in extreme cases of impaired
volitional capacity, such an assumption would seem to comport with the actual
behavior of juries.
Thus, speculation about silent states can run in either direction. But the
incontrovertible fact is that no state-including South Carolina-has by
express legislative enactment rendered offenders who lacked sufficient capacity
to conform their conduct to the requirements of law eligible for capital
punishment, and except for the decision in Jamie Wilson's case, no court has
ever construed the laws of any American state to permit such a result. At least
nineteen states' laws clearly preclude the possibility of such a sentence, and
this virtual unanimity among those states whose laws speak directly to this
issue more than establishes the "evolving standard of decency" that precludes
the execution of a class of offenders.' 5'
2. Behavior of Sentencing Juries
The silence of many death penalty states on the question of the death
eligibility of a person totally lacking in the ability to control his conduct
appears to be attributable to the screening behavior of prosecutors and the
sentencing behavior of juries. The latter is itself another "significant and
148. Id.
149. Id. at 852-53.
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1999); IDAHO CODE § 19-2523 (Michie 1996); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5 (West 1997).
151. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-93 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
596-97 (1977).
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reliable objective index of contemporary values" regarding a given
punishment." 2 Assessing the willingness of juries to impose death sentences
on defendants who have been formally determined to lack the capacity to
conform their conduct to the law is undeniably problematic, for the revealing
reason that in only two states-South Carolina and Pennsylvania-are such
sentences even theoretically possible. In these two states, it does not appear
that death has been made available as a sentencing option to juries in any
significant number of cases. Indeed, the State informed the South Carolina
Supreme Court in the direct appeal of Jamie Wilson's death sentence that it
was "not aware of any cases in Pennsylvania where the death penalty was
sought in a GBMI situation."' 5a Ten years later, we are unable to find even one
other case in which a death sentence has been pronounced upon a person found
unable to control his conduct.
In South Carolina, Jamie's case remains the only one in which a jury or
judge has sentenced a mentally ill offender to death after first determining that
his illness deprived him of sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law. In other jurisdictions, it is possible that some offenders
that juries believed were unable to control their conduct were sentenced to
death, but no record has been left of that finding because the statutory structure
did not ask the jury to make such a determination. But certainly, if such
situations were common, one would expect capital defense attorneys, zealous
in their representation, to have raised this as an issue at some point in the
appellate proceedings. Since no court in the nation has ever determined
whether volitionally incapacitated defendants are death eligible absent a GBMI
statute, and only the South Carolina Supreme Court has determined this
question under such a statute, the number of such cases must be very small
indeed.
It is impossible to know the number of times in which such sentences have
been submitted to juries. But whether juries have been given few or many
opportunities to impose such sentences, the undeniable fact is that the
imposition of death sentences on such volitionally impaired offenders by
American juries is so infrequent as to be virtually unknown. And, if we turn to
the indicator of previous executions, the picture is even more stark: there are
none. In contrast, the Atkins court deemed the practice of executing the
mentally retarded "truly unusual" because actual executions were limited to
five states.' 4 If ever there was a punishment whose "freakish" rarity establishes
its unconstitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, it is this one.
152. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976), quoted in Coker, 433 U.S. at 596; see also
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (noting infrequency of execution of mentally retarded offenders in states
permitting the practice).
153. Brief of Respondent at 36, State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 413 S.E.2d 19 (1992) (No.
23545) (emphasis added).
154. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
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Chart 2 summarizes the extremity of Jamie Wilson's sentence, whether
measured by the governing legal standard, the number of death sentences
imposed, or the number of executions:
Chart 2
Death Penalty Eligibility of Defendants with "Insufficient Capacity" to
Control their Conduct
State Eligible? Number of Number of
Death Executions
Sentences
Alabama Has not decided 0 0
Alaska Has not decided (but no 0 0
death penalty)
Arizona Probably not 0 0
Arkansas NO 0 0
California Has not decided 0 0
Colorado Has not decided 0 0
Connecticut NO 0 0
Delaware Has not decided 0 0
Florida Probably not 0 0
Georgia NO 0 0
Hawaii NO 0 0
Idaho Has not decided 0 0
Illinois Has not decided 0 0
Indiana Probably not 0 0
Iowa Has not decided (but no 0 0
death penalty)
Kansas Has not decided 0 0
Kentucky NO 0 0
Louisiana Has not decided 0 L 0
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State Eligible? Number of Number of
Death Executions
Sentences
Maine Has not decided (but no 0 0
death penalty)
Maryland NO 0 0
Massachusetts NO 0 0
Michigan NO 0 0
Minnesota Has not decided (but no 0 0
death penalty)
Mississippi Probably not 0 0
Missouri Has not decided 0 0
Montana NO 0 0
Nebraska Has not decided 0 0
Nevada Probably not 0 0
New NO 0 0
Hampshire
New Jersey Has not decided 0 0
New Mexico NO 0 0
New York NO 0 0
North Carolina Has not decided 0 0
North Dakota Has not decided (but no 0 0
death penalty)
Ohio Probably not 0 0
Oklahoma Has not decided 0 0
Oregon NO 0 0
Pennsylvania Has not decided 0 0
Rhode Island NO 0 0
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State Eligible? Number of Number of
Death Executions
Sentences
South Carolina YES 1 0
South Dakota Has not decided 0 0
Tennessee Has not decided 0 0
Texas Has not decided 0 0
Utah Has not decided 0 0
Vermont NO 0 0
Virginia NO 0 0
Washington Has not decided 0 0
West Virginia NO 0 0
Wisconsin NO 0 0
Wyoming NO 0 0
3. Public Opinion
Public opinion, as reflected by polling data and by informed public
commentary, may in some cases shed additional light on contemporary societal
norms regarding criminal punishments. 5' Little direct evidence is available
concerning contemporary public attitudes toward the narrow question raised in
this case, most probably because the question has so rarely arisen. Indeed, since
Jamie Wilson appears to be the only person in the United States to have been
sentenced to death after an express finding that he lacked sufficient capacity to
conform his conduct to the law, it is not surprising that no public opinion
research has been undertaken to probe Americans' views concerning such
sentences.
Similarly, professional associations in the mental health field have not had
any reason to focus on the execution of the volitionally incapacitated, an issue
which, until this case, seemed so settled, and any search for other public
155. See id. at 316 n.21 (reviewing public opinion survey data and positions of pertinent
professional associations on question of executing mentally retarded offenders).
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responses to such sentences must, of necessity, be limited to this case.1 6 Viewed
more broadly, however, nearly every major mental health association in the
United States has published a policy statement addressing the umbrella issue of
the execution of mentally ill offenders, and all of those organizations advocate
either an outright ban on executing all mentally ill offenders, or a moratorium
until a more comprehensive evaluation system can be implemented. Although
these organizations differ on whether to outlaw or suspend such executions, they
unanimously agree that the current capital punishment system inadequately
addresses the complexity of cases involving mentally ill defendants.' 57
It is obvious from these general statements concerning a wide range of
mentally ill offenders that these organizations adamantly oppose the
execution of persons as severely mentally ill as Jamie Wilson. The reason for
156. An example of the editorial reaction to the sentence imposed upon Jamie Wilson is this
editorial by the Atlanta Constitution:
While Wilson's crime was inarguably ghastly, his disordered mental state
makes his rampage more a hideous tragedy than an unmitigated outrage.
What purpose would his execution serve? Would it deter other psychotics
from similar behavior? The very notion is ridiculous.. . . At best, Wilson's
execution would be no more than a hopeless gesture of protest against a
crime that defies understanding. At worst, it would be an act of unspeakable
meanness. James Wilson could not control his own worst impulses.
Sometimes our judicial system has the same problem.
It's Wrong to Kill the Mentally Ill, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 14, 1989, at D6, quoted in
Emanuel, supra note 9, at 38 n.5. See also Wilson Case Raises Legal, Ethical Questions, THE
STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 14, 1989, at D2 ("[I]s there any justice in electrocuting a young man
... whose mind was so diseased that he could not resist his murderous impulses? We think not.").
157. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass., MORATORIUM ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES (approved October 2000), APA Document Ref. No. 200006, available at
http://www.psych.org/archives/200006.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2003); AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS'N., RESOLUTION ON THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.apa.org/pi/deathpenalty.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2003); NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR THE
MENTALLY ILL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS, available at
http://web.nami.org/update/unitedcrminal.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2003); NAT'L MENTAL
HEALTH Ass., DEATH PENALTY AND PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (approved March 10, 2001),
available at http://www.nmha.org/position/deathpenalty/deathpenalty.cfm (last visited Aug. 27,
2003). Specifically, the National Mental Health Association (NMHA) found that the fact-finding
portion of capital trials "fails to identify who among those convicted and sentenced to death
actually has a mental illness." Id. Similarly, the American Psychological Association (APA)
argued that too many "[p]rocedural problems, such as assessing competency," render capital
punishment unfair to the mentally ill. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra. Such procedural
inadequacies fall far short of the "basic requirements of due process," according to the American
Psychiatric Association (AMPA). AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra. Thus, the NMHA, APA, and
AMPA believe that the criminal justice system routinely executes many mentally ill individuals
without realizing that any illness existed and, therefore, without considering that illness as a
mitigating factor. All of these organizations favor a moratorium. The National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill (NAMI) has voiced a stronger opinion, advocating for an outright ban on death
sentences for individuals with any type of brain disorder. NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY
ILL, supra. NAMI asserts that the overwhelming number of violent acts committed by the mentally
ill is the result of neglect or inadequate treatment of the illness-as was present in Jamie's
case-and concludes that the answer therefore is "treatment, not punishment." Id.
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the paucity of direct evidence of public and expert attitudes towards the
execution of the subcategory of mentally ill defendants who lack the capacity
to control their behavior is not hard to discern. The issue is no longer a
subject of investigation or public debate because such executions are by and
large nonexistent. The use of the death penalty as a punishment for
essentially involuntary crimes has long ago disappeared both from our
society's arsenal of criminal sanctions and from our public consciousness.
And, but for this one anomalous case, this narrow question might never have
been raised again.
Jamie Wilson's death sentence also runs afoul of international law and
opinion. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
specifically forbids the use of the death penalty in an arbitrary manner.' The
Human Rights Committee of the United Nations interpreted the treaty to
forbid the execution of persons with severe mental illness."' In addition, for
three consecutive years-1999, 2000, 2001-the United Nations Commis-
sion on Human Rights has adopted resolutions calling on all states that
maintain the death penalty "[n]ot to impose the death penalty on a person
suffering from any form of mental disorder or to execute any such person."160
The Commission interpreted the phrase "mental disorder" to encompass both
mental illness and mental retardation. 6 ' As recently as 2000, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Ektrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions
called on the United States "to take immediate steps to bring [its] domestic
legislation and legal practice into line with the international standards
prohibiting the imposition of death sentences in regard to minors and
mentally ill or handicapped persons."' 62
The prohibition on the execution of the mentally ill also qualifies as
customary international law because it satisfies the required elements: (1)
general practice and (2) opiniojuris. The general practice among states with
death penalty statutes is to exclude those whose mental illness prevents them
from conforming their actions to the requirements of the law.'63 Furthermore,
158. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 6, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 174.
159. See William A. Schabas, International Norms on Execution of the Insane and the
Mentally Retarded, 4 CpjM. L.F. 95, 100-01 (1993).
160. The Question of the Death Penalty, Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2001/68, U.N.
ESCOR, 57th Sess., 67th mtg. 4(e), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/68 (2001); The Question of
the Death Penalty, Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2000/65, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess., 66th mtg.
3(e), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 (2000); The Question of the Death Penalty, Comm'n on
Human Rights Res. 1991/61, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., 65th mtg. 3(e), U.N.
Doc.E/CN.4/RES/1999/61 (1999).
161. See supra note 160. Resolutions from all three years included mental illness and mental
retardation within the phrase "mental disorder."
162. Civil and Political Rights, Including Questions of: Disappearances and Summary Exe-
cutions: Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Prov.
Agenda Item 1 (b), 97, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/3 (2000).
163. See Schabas, supra note 159, at 110-13.
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as we have previously established, Jamie Wilson is the only known person in
the United States who was sentenced to death after the factfinder determined
the person suffered from a lack of capacity to conform to the requirements of
the law. The prohibition satisfies the second element, opinio juris, because
several international documents condemn executing the mentally ill.
Resolution 2001/68 of the Commission of Human Rights condemns the
imposition of the death penalty on people who suffer from mental
disorders." The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court exempts
persons from criminal responsibility if "[t]he person suffers from a mental
disease or defect that destroys that person's capacity to appreciate the
unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her
conduct to conform to the requirements of the law." ' Also, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia upheld the mental incapacity
defense when "abnormality of mind ... substantially impair[ed] ... ability to
control." 66
The Supreme Court has often considered international standards when
determining Eighth Amendment questions. 7 Most recently, in deciding that
164. The Question of the Death Penalty, Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2001/68, U.N.
ESCOR, 57th Sess., 67th mtg. 4(e), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/68 (2001).
165. Rome Statute of the Int'l Crim. Ct., art. 3 l(l)(a), available at www.un.org/law/icc (last
visited Sept. 3, 2003).
166. Prosecutor v. Delali, Judgment, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Case No. IT-96-21-T, Nov. 16, 1998, 399.
167. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) ("The conclusion that it
would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old
at the time of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed by respected
professional organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the
leading members of the Western European community."); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796
n.22 (1982) ("[Flelony murder has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in
Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe.");
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (noting that the Court previously examined "the
climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment. It is thus
not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the
death penalty for rape where death did not ensue." (citing United Nations, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Capital Punishment 40, 86 (1968))); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100 (1958) (holding that the policy of the Eighth Amendment
is firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice. The
phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the English Declaration
of Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents can be traced back to the
Magna Carta. The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to
punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within
the limits of civilized standards.[)].
Realizing the history of the Eighth Amendment, Justice Blackmun remarked, "[t]he drafters of the
Amendment were concerned, at root, with 'the dignity of man,' and understood that 'evolving
standards of decency' should be measured, in part, against international norms." Harry Blackmun,
The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 45-46 (1994) (internal citations
omitted).
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consensual private homosexual activity is constitutionally protected, the
Court found international opinion and practice relevant to its interpretation of
the due process clause.16 Even more to the point, although the Court rejected
and discounted international law and opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky when it
held that the Eighth Amendment did not bar the death penalty for sixteen-
and seventeen-year old offenders,169 it did factor international law and
opinion into the constitutional calculus in Atkins.
70 Just as in Atkins, the
weight of international law and opinion also reveals that the severely
mentally ill should not be subject to execution.
For all of these reasons, the sentence pronounced upon Jamie Wilson is,
without doubt, "opposed by a national consensus, sufficiently uniform and of
sufficiently long standing, to render it cruel and unusual punishment within
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment."'' The Eighth Amendment analysis
applied by the Court to assess the constitutionality of the death penalty for
the mentally retarded in Atkins v. Virginia,' for rapists in Coker v.
Georgia,'73 for nontriggermen in Enmund v. Florida,'
74 and for fifteen-year-
olds in Thompson v. Oklahoma,' clearly establishes the inadmissibility of
the sentence imposed in this case. The categories of death sentences struck
down in Atkins, Coker, Enmund, and Thompson appear to have been rarely
authorized and rarely imposed, but they were not wholly unknown. By
contrast, Jamie's sentence probably would not have been imposed-let alone
carried out-in any other American jurisdiction, and there is no record of a
similar sentence ever having been imposed on even a single other convicted
murderer. Thus, if the sentences imposed on Atkins, Thompson, Coker, and
Enmund constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the sentence imposed on
Jamie Wilson surely does as well.
168. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003).
169. 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989).
170. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
171. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
173. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
174. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
175. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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B. Imposition of a Death Sentence for Conduct the Defendant was
Unable to Control is Grossly Disproportionate to His Personal
Moral Culpability and Lacks Penological Justification
1. The Moral Culpability of Volitionally Incapacitated Offenders
Does Not Warrant a Death Sentence
A sentence that is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime"
violates the Eighth Amendment. 76 Determination of the proportionality of a
capital sentence, however, cannot be based solely upon the magnitude of
harm resulting from the offense. "For purposes of imposing the death penalty
... punishment must be tailored to [a defendant's] personal responsibility
and moral guilt." '77 Thus, in considering claims that particular categories of
convicted murderers are not constitutionally punishable by death, the
Supreme Court has always focused on the offenders' moral culpability and
their degree of personal responsibility for the harm resulting from the
offense. 178
The Supreme Court's rationale for accepting the contention that mentally
retarded murderers are categorically so lacking in moral blameworthiness as
to be ineligible for the death penalty compels the conclusion that the
volitionally incapacitated are likewise ineligible. 79 The Court noted the
obvious cognitive limitations of the retarded, but also stressed their
"diminished capacities . . . to control impulses" and the "abundant evidence
that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan."' 80
These characterizations have even greater applicability to those who, because
176. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell and
Stevens, JJ.).
177. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. See also California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("(P]unishment should be directly related to the personal culpability
of the criminal defendant.").
178. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding death penalty unconstitutional
for mentally retarded offenders); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (finding death
penalty not unconstitutional for sixteen- and seventeen- year-old offenders); Thompson, 487 U.S.
at 838 (holding death penalty unconstitutional for offenders under sixteen); Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137, 157-58 (1986) (finding death penalty not unconstitutional for nontriggerman who was
major participant in dangerous felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life);
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801 (finding death penalty unconstitutional for minor participant who did not
intend to kill).
179. Indeed, even prior to Atkins, Jamie Wilson's ineligibility for the death penalty ought
to have been clear because Penry's rationale strongly implied the ineligibility of persons who were
volitionally incapacitated. The Penry Court was careful to note that by rejecting Penry's insanity
defense and convicting him of capital murder under Texas law, the jury had necessarily found
"that Penry knew that his conduct was wrong and was capable of conforming his conduct to the
requirements of the law." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989) (emphasis added). This
second finding was the diametric opposite of what the trial judge found to be true of Jamie Wilson.
Thus, Jamie Wilson lacked one of the two characteristics that the Penry Court found to be crucial
in ascribing to Penry sufficient moral responsibility to justify the death penalty.
180. Atkins, 536 U.S. at318.
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of mental illness, are completely unable to conform their conduct to the
requirements of the law. Moreover, this inference as to the moral centrality of
volitional control is corroborated by the Court's reasoning in determining
that execution of persons under the age of sixteen violates the cruel and
unusual punishments clause. 8' In discussing the lesser "personal culpability"
of adolescents, the Court cited with approval the following passage:
Adolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years,
are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-
disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be
just as harmful to victims as those committed by older
persons, but they deserve less punishment because
adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct
and to think in long-range terms than adults. 2
Certainly if crimes committed by the retarded and by young adolescents
deserve less punishment due to those groups' lesser capacity to control their
own conduct, the crimes of persons who, by reason of mental illness, lack
even sufficient capacity to control their conduct are also deserving of less
than the most severe punishment.8 3
2. Neither Retribution nor Deterrence are Served by Death
Sentences for Volitionally Incapacitated Offenders"4
A capital sentence violates the Eighth Amendment when it is "so totally
without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of
suffering."'8 5 Unless the death penalty "measurably contributes" to either the
goal of deterrence or the goal of retribution, "it is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering," and hence an
unconstitutional punishment."' 6 Neither retribution nor deterrence is served
181. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834.
182. Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n. 11 (1982) (quoting TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS,
CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978))).
183. The philosophical literature on moral culpability, though not invoked by the Court,
supports this conclusion. See infra note 192.
184. Ellis, supra note 9, at 90-92, argues that the proportionality requirement and the
penological justification for retributivism should not be viewed as separate tests, given that both
hinge on the culpability of the defendant. Without deciding the merits of that view, we follow the
Supreme Court's pattern of analysis here, largely to demonstrate that under any standard the Court
might apply, volitionally incapacitated offenders are on the unconstitutional side of the line.
185. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.).
186. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977)).
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by the execution of defendants whose mental illness rendered them powerless
to avoid criminal conduct.
The South Carolina Supreme Court stated without elaboration that "the
penological goal of retribution is served by this sentence, as, under South
Carolina law, Wilson is completely culpable and responsible for his
crimes." '87 However, whether a defendant possesses that "degree of
culpability associated with the death penalty"' 8 cannot be resolved by
reliance on state law definitions of crimes and defenses. Although "[s]tates
have authority to make aiders and abettors equally responsible . . . with
principals, or to enact felony-murder statutes,"'89 minor participation in a
felony that results in an unanticipated death does not evidence sufficient
"moral culpability" to justify the imposition of a death sentence on retributive
grounds. 9 ° Similarly, South Carolina may, unfettered by the Constitution,
choose to make those who act without sufficient capacity to conform their
requirements to the law as "equally responsible" as those who act with
completely unimpaired capacity. But in order to justify a capital sentence for
such offenders as retribution, a state must explain how executing such
offenders "measurably contribute[s] to the retributive end of ensuring that the
criminal gets his just deserts."'' This simply cannot be done: once a fact-
finder has determined that a defendant's mental illness has deprived him of
sufficient capacity to avoid criminal behavior, there can be no measurable
contribution to retribution, but only the "exacting [of] mindless vengeance"
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. 92
187. State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 508-09, 413 S.E.2d 19, 25 (1992).
188. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 338 (1989).
189. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978) (plurality opinion).
190. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-801; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002)
("[The] deficiencies [of mentally retarded offenders] do not warrant an exemption from criminal
sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.").
191. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
192. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (finding execution of the insane
amounts to the "exacting of mindless vengeance"). The philosophical literature on retribution
lends further support for this argument. There is dispute among philosophical theorists as to
whether retribution is a legitimate goal of punishment at all. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE &
PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 156-201 (1990)
(discussing retribution as a flawed penological goal in both theory and practice); Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1985)
(arguing retribution is a penological goal that should be beyond state power in a liberal society);
David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1623 (1992) (arguing
retribution does not actually support the values it sets for itself); Russ Shafer-Landau, The Failure
of Retributivism, 82(3) PHIL. STUD. 289 (June 1996) (arguing retribution is not a comprehensive
theory). Even among those theorists who support retribution as a valid and desirable penological
goal, none would argue that any retributive purpose is served in the criminal punishment of
someone like Jamie Wilson. This is because retributive theorists justify punishment based on the
moral culpability and blameworthiness of the offender. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT,
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001) (arguing that retribution is a valid penological goal
and should be based on the blameworthiness of the offender); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE
AND SANCTIONS (1993) (arguing that retribution requires proportional sentencing and culpability
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Nor is a plausible deterrence argument possible to construct, for "the
death penalty has little deterrent force against defendants who have reduced
capacity for considered choice." '93 Deterrence certainly cannot justify
imposing the death penalty upon volitionally incapacitated defendants
because by definition, those whose mental disorders robbed them of sufficient
capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of law are incapable of
responding to legal rules.194 In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court
observed that for murderers under the age of sixteen, "[t]he likelihood that
the . . . offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any
weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually
nonexistent." '95 Young offenders, however, are merely extremely unlikely to
make choices about unlawful behavior based on possible penalties, whereas
those who lack the sufficient capacity to conform their conduct to the law
cannot make choices about unlawful behavior, regardless of the stakes.
Indeed, just as it is for mentally retarded offenders, the "cold calculus" of
cost and benefit is "at the opposite end of the spectrum from behavior"
'96 of
those who cannot control their own conduct. Finally, as the Supreme Court
also noted concerning an exemption of the mentally retarded from the death
penalty, exempting those who are unable to conform their conduct to the
requirements of the law will not lessen the deterrent effect upon other
offenders. 97
is determined by the blameworthiness of the offender). In order for an offender to be morally
culpable or blameworthy, that person must have been capable of doing other than he or she did.
See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
152 (1968) ("What is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the
normal capacities, physical and mental, ... for abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair
opportunity to exercise these capacities."); WOJCIECH SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE: SOCIAL
JUSTICE AND LEGAL THEORY 241 (1985) ("Retributivism is the only theory of punishment which
takes the notion of human responsibility seriously because it justifies punishment solely on the
basis of acts and situations which were under the control of the perpetrator concerned. Only those
facts which are believed to be free human acts are relevant in assessing guilt and deciding about
punishment."); Michael Moore, Choice. Character, and Excuse, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 29 (1990)
(arguing for the choice theory of excuse which requires that to be deserving of punishment an
offender must have been able to do other than that which he or she did). In Jamie Wilson's case,
the South Carolina court determined that Jamie Wilson was unable to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law and therefore his act was not a result of any exercise of free will nor was it
under his control. Thus, no philosophical theorist would support any level of criminal punishment
in Jamie Wilson's case based on retributive ideals and certainly none would support a punishment
as severe as the death penalty. See Dolinko, supra, at 1650 (arguing that Jamie Wilson's case
would be understood by retributivists as a "gross misunderstanding of what retributivism is").
193. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.l 1 (1982)) (emphasis added).
194. Cf Harris v. State, 499 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind. 1986) (explaining deterrence rationale
may support execution of Indiana GBMI offenders where state law defines GBMI offenders as
"not defendants who... fully lacked the capacity to conform their behavior to the law").
195. 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988).
196. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
197. Id. at 320.
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Thus, both logic and precedent dictate the conclusion that the death
penalty can serve no deterrent purpose when applied to defendants who
lacked sufficient capacity to avoid their criminal acts. Because the capital
sentencing of persons determined to be unable to control their conduct
amounts to execution for essentially nonvolitional conduct, neither
retribution nor deterrence are thereby measurably advanced.
C. Capital Prosecution of Volitionally Incapacitated Offenders Carries
Heightened Risks of Unjustified Executions
In Atkins, the Supreme Court cited the enhanced risk faced by retarded
defendants "that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which
may call for a less severe penalty" 9' as a second justification for the national
consensus that they should be categorically excluded from eligibility for the
death penalty. Volitionally incapacitated defendants, such as Jamie Wilson,
face similar obstacles in "mak[ing] a persuasive showing of mitigation in the
face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors."' 99
Any defendant whose mental illness at the time of the offense rendered
him unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law is a defendant
suffering from severe mental illness. Severe mental illness, like significant
cognitive limitations, sharply constricts a defendant's ability "to give
meaningful assistance to their counsel."' '0 As Jamie Wilson's case aptly
illustrates, volitional incapacity (as distinguished from impaired capacity) is
frequently the consequence of hallucinations and delusions. Hallucinations
and delusions diminish the defendant's ability to report in two distinct ways:
they impair his ability to accurately observe, and, particularly where the
delusions are paranoid (as Jamie's are), they cause mistrust of persons
attempting to help and consequently impair willingness to cooperate with
defense attorneys. Thus, whether the question is the accuracy of aggravating
details of the crime or the existence of mitigating circumstances, a severely
mentally ill defendant is less able to assist his attorney in presenting "factors
which may call for a less severe penalty."' 0 ' A second impediment to
effective defense of the volitionally incapacitated lies in the fact that
defendants who are unable to conform their conduct to the requirements of
law usually are equally unable to conform their conduct to the requirements
of courtroom decorum and procedure. They therefore "are typically poor
witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack
of remorse for their crimes."202 Moreover, when such defendants are heavily
medicated in an attempt to reduce psychotic symptoms and restore
198. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
202. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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competence (as Jamie was), the resulting synthetic competence is likely to
create its own significant impediments to cooperation with attorneys, and a
stoney-faced demeanor that is likely to be read as indifference.
2
1
3
Finally, mental illness that disables a defendant from controlling his own
conduct "can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the
aggravating factor of future dangerousness
2 4 will be found by the jury.
' 20 5
Indeed, it is hard to imagine a fact about a defendant that would engender
greater fear of future violence, and yet would not reflect moral culpability on
his part.
In summary then, as we have demonstrated in this section of the Article,
the weight of national consensus is substantially greater with respect to
volitionally incapacitated defendants' cases than it is with respect to mentally
retarded defendants. A capital sensence is grossly disproportionate to such
offenders' moral culpability, serves no permissible penological goal, and
carries an enhanced risk of error. In short, imposing the death penalty on such
offenders is cruel and unusual punishment barred by the Eighth Amendment.
V. BEYOND THE NON-WILLING: THE APPLICATION OF ATKINS TO OTHER
SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS
Jamie Wilson is hardly the only seriously mentally ill death row inmate.
Most mental health organizations and professionals would oppose executing
many, if not all, of these offenders, and drawing on the Atkins analogy, one
might predict a campaign to put all seriously mentally ill offenders beyond
the reach of the death penalty. Such a campaign may be laudable, and even
ultimately successful, but it faces obstacles that Jamie Wilson's Eighth
Amendment argument does not.
As mentioned in the introduction to this Article, two state court justices
have expressed the view that the rationale of Atkins likewise precludes the
execution of severely mentally ill offenders.0 6 Neither of them would claim
that the rationale of Atkins reaches all mentally ill offenders, which would
encompass a huge number of current death row inmates, not to mention a
large proportion of the regular population. Indeed, the author of one of these
opinions explicitly disavows such a generalization.2 7 Whether one takes the
203. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[D]rugs
[that restore competence] can prejudice the accused in two principal ways: (1) by altering his
demeanor in a manner that will prejudice his reactions and presentation in the courtroom, and (2)
by rendering him unable or unwilling to assist counsel.").
204. Future dangerousness is a statutory aggravating factor in Virginia, but not in South
Carolina. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's observation is equally apt in states where future
dangerousness is not among the statutory aggravators because it is beyond dispute that juries in
such jurisdictions also give it substantial weight.
205. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
206. See Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting); State
v. Nelson, 803 A.2d 1, 47 (N.J. 2002) (Zazzali, J., concurring).
207. Nelson, 803 A.2d at 44.
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real-politik approach that the Supreme Court would never invalidate so many
death sentences, or makes the more respectful observation that there is no
"evolving standard of decency" for such a broad categorical exemption, the
bottom line is the same: not any time soon.
The question then becomes whether there is a category broader than the
volitionally incapacitated, yet narrower than the mentally ill, about which
there is a consensus. We think there are several possibilities, most of which
we must reject.
A. Looking to the Experts: Psychotic Disorders
One way of approaching this issue is to look to psychiatrists for an
answer, or at least a set of priorities. Atkins, of course, did not outlaw the
application of the death penalty to all persons with subnormal intelligence, as
measured by psychologists. Instead, it seized on an IQ score of seventy, a
level that represents two full standard deviations from the mean, which
means that two and a half percent of the population would be expected to
score below that cut-off. However, because a diagnosis of mental retardation
also requires significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two
areas and an onset before the age of eighteen,0 8 the prevalence in the
population is estimated to be only about one percent.09 A parallel path,
therefore, would be to ask which offenders are most severely mentally ill.
Our first2"0 rough cut (educated both by the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM) and by professional encounters with mental health
professionals) is that the experts' response would be: defendants suffering
from psychotic disorders should be categorically exempt. The DSM-IV lists
schizophrenia, schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder,
delusional disorder, brief psychotic disorder, shared psychotic disorder,
psychotic disorder due to a general medical condition, substance-induced
psychotic disorder, and psychotic disorder not otherwise specified.2 ' These
disorders vary in etiology and duration, but they share a constellation of
symptoms that cluster around delusions and hallucinations on the one hand,
and disorganized or catatonic behavior on the other.212
Psychotic disorders, like mental retardation, are relatively rare. Estimates
of the prevalence of schizophrenia run from .5% to 1.5%,23 and while the
208. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 41 (4th ed., text rev. 2000).
209. Id. at 46.
210. An even broader argument could be made: anyone suffering from an Axis I diagnosis
should be exempt. Given the breadth of that category, which includes not only schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder, but also anxiety disorders and sleep disorders, we think such an argument is not
worth serious consideration, at least at this time.
211. See, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 207, at 298.
212. Id. at 297-298.
213. Id. at 308.
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estimates of the other disorders are less reliable, at least in the United States
and other developed countries, most are quite rare.214 We think that psychotic
disorders fit not only with public conceptions of mental illness, but that their
hallmarks--delusions and hallucinations-are likely to result in significantly
diminished moral responsibility. The one obvious exception to these
generalizations-substance-induced psychotic disorder-is both more
common (albeit for short time periods) and less likely to be able to claim any
consensus concerning the diminishment of moral culpability; this obstacle
could be surmounted, however, by excluding self-induced psychoses." 5
We have deliberately painted the argument for a psychotic disorders
categorical exemption with broad strokes because we must rather quickly, if
somewhat reluctantly, reject it. First, if we remain true to the Supreme
Court's methodology, we have to observe that there is simply no way to
assemble an evolving standard of decency that prohibits the execution of
persons with psychotic disorders; this is both because no statutes or judicial
opinions are written in those terms, or anything approximating them, and
because there is no obvious way to count the number of persons actually
sentenced or actually executed who have suffered from these disorders.216
There are at least two additional barriers to this standard. First is the fact
that the most common (and severe) of these disorders-schizophrenia-is
frequently undiagnosable at the time of a defendant's crime. In part this is
true because during the onset period it is easily misdiagnosed as borderline
personality disorder or other personality disorders, as many of the symptoms
of these disorders overlap. Moreover, because the diagnostic criteria require
at least one month of active phase symptoms and at least six months of the
disease, missed schizophrenia diagnoses also occur after the onset period due
to a lack of adequate information about defendants, many of whom were
living in situations not likely to produce accurate reports of their mental
state.2t 7
A second difficulty with the "psychotic disorder" candidate for
categorical exemption from the death penalty lies in its lack of a necessary
214. Schizophreniform disorder has approximately one-fifth the incidence of schizophrenia,
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASs'N, supra note 208, at 318; schizoaffective disorder is "less common," id.
at 321; delusional disorder is estimated at .03% of the population, id. at 326; brief psychotic
disorder is rare in developed countries, id. at 330-3 1; "psychotic disorders due to a general
medical condition are difficult to estimate given the wide variety of underlying medical
etiologies." Id. at 336.
215. The exclusion of self-induced conditions has precedent in the doctrines that prohibit
the use of voluntary intoxication to negate recklessness. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1985)
(codifying the common law).
216. This is not to say that we endorse the Court's bean-counting approach to the cruel and
unusual punishment clause. Given that approach, however, to be successful, candidates for
categorical exemption must be phrased in terms of beans that can be counted.
217. A diagnosis of mental retardation requires onset before the age of eighteen, which can
also be problematic, but in many cases school records can provide the necessary documentation
of juvenile onset.
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nexus to the crime. Mentally retarded individuals are disabled all the time,
but as the popular movie, "A Beautiful Mind," vividly demonstrated, a
schizophrenic can be relatively normal at some times and in some situations.
One might add a nexus requirement, but it would have to be formulated very
carefully. Merely saying that the psychotic disorder was the cause of the
crime would not suffice. For example, if the defendant's delusion is that God
has called him to be the Dalai Lama, and he then shot the Dalai Lama, the
psychotic disorder that produced the delusion would be the cause of the
crime. Yet we might want to know more before we judge his moral
culpability; the Constitution might not exempt him on the basis of the bare
delusion, but might exempt him if the delusion were accompanied by
command hallucinations from God.
This may vaguely remind the reader of the Durham2"' product rule
debacle, and it should. The Durham rule, followed for nearly twenty years by
the District of Columbia Circuit, provided that "an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
defect."2 9 The attraction of that rule, much like the attraction of a psychotic
disorder standard in this context, was that it permitted psychiatrists to testify
in an unfettered way about the question on which they were indeed experts.
The flip side of this advantage was that the expert's diagnosis was completely
determinative, arguably usurping the jury's function. When the D.C. Circuit
overruled Durham, it recounted a dramatic illustration of that problem, in
which a doctor testified on Friday afternoon that the defendant, a
"psychopath," was not mentally ill, but on Monday morning testified that he
was, because in the interim the hospital at which he was a physician decided
to classify psychopathic personality as a mental disease.22 Obviously,
changes that may be entirely appropriate within the discipline of psychiatry,
if incorporated wholesale into the law, may create bizarre results.
Justice Zazzali's variation of the "severe mental illness" approach
avoids, or at least attempts to avoid, complete dependence on psychiatric
diagnosis. In State v. Nelson,22' he tells a compelling and bizarre story of the
defendant, a story that incorporates but does not turn solely upon psychiatric
diagnosis.222 The defendant, Leslie Ann Nelson, a transsexual, was diagnosed
218. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by United States
v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
219. Id. at 874-75.
220. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 978 (reporting on the facts of In Re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18
(D.D.C. 1957)).
221. 803 A.2d 1 (N.J. 2002) (Zazzali, J., concurring).
222. [The defendant Nelson] was emotionally disturbed throughout her childhood
and mentally ill in her adolescent and adult years. She was obsessed with
and threatened to commit suicide. She was involuntarily committed to a
psychiatric facility and eventually underwent a sex change operation....
[She] stated that she wanted to undergo sex reassignment surgery to become
an exotic dancer, adult film actress, or prostitute.... Unlike most people
who undergo the surgery as a remedial response to transexuality, defendant
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with "a longstanding depression," and with "problems of social withdrawal,
delusions, paranoia, and schizoid and borderline personality disorders." '223
When police came to arrest her, she used an AK-47 to kill one of them and
inflict multiple wounds on another-all because she wanted to avoid going to
jail where she would lose her guns (which she viewed as surrogate children),
and would be unable to keep up her appearance as a woman.224 In response to
these facts, Justice Zazzali makes no generalizations at all and does not
exempt a defined class of defendants, explaining, "[m]y approach is specific
to [the defendant in this case] and based on her specific set of psychological
problems and her condition during the circumstances of her crimes...,225
This "I know it when I see it" approach does solve the problem of
overreliance on psychiatrists, but it does so at the cost of predictability.
Perhaps state constitutional law can manage such an unwieldy test (though it
sounds more like proportionality review to our ears), but it is hard to imagine
how this could fit into Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as we know it. To
be consistent with existing Eighth Amendment precedent, we need to define a
category of mentally ill offenders that both permits us to demonstrate an
evolving standard of decency and simultaneously avoids fears about reliance
on medical diagnoses that do not accurately track culpability concerns. If
this suggests looking to the substantive criminal law for a standard, rather
than to medical experts, that is indeed the direction in which we are heading,
but we digress first to consider using the GBMI standards, as one
commentator has proposed.
B. Look to Existing Procedures: GBMI Statutes
So if lawyers and judges, rightly or wrongly, are unwilling to give
control to doctors, would it make sense to rely on existing procedures? One
commentator, Anne Emanuel, takes the position that defendants who are
found GBMI should be excluded from eligibility for the death penalty
because GBMI statutes reflect a determination that the individual's "mental
abnormality bears a causal relation to the... crime, but does not prevent the
formation of the necessary level of mens rea." '226 She argues that because this
is both a plausible and the "most favorable" interpretation of the GBMI
verdicts, it should be adopted.227 This interpretation, according to Emanuel,
...did not want to become a woman in order to reconcile her physical
gender with her psychological gender.
Id. At 44-45 (Zazzali, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 45-46.
224. Id. at 9, 50.
225. Id. at 49 (Zazzali, J., concurring).
226. Emanuel, supra note 9, at 54.
227. Id. at 52 nn.105--08.
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then necessarily implies diminished responsibility,22 which in turn implies
that the death penalty is inappropriate.22 9
This, it seems to us, is the least attractive option. First, we doubt this
interpretation of the GBMI statutes, given their history. Second, we cannot
imagine how an evolving consensus could be constructed from these statutes,
given the great variety of definitions of mental illness encompassed by the
various statutes, a variety that Emanuel herself notes.23° Finally, and most
importantly, the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on a
particular defendant depends upon whether the state has enacted a GBMI
statute and the terms of that statute; the protection such a rule of categorical
ineligibility might afford defendants is surely evanescent, given that the
legislature could terminate that protection simply by repealing the GBMI
statute.
C. Look to the Substantive Law: Insanity Defense Variations
If we do not look to existing procedures, we must face the question of
inventing procedures, whatever other standard for determining categorical
ineligibility we elect. We pause only a moment here to note that this issue
also arises with respect to the categorical exclusion of mentally retarded
offenders and is left unresolved by Atkins. Even the preliminary question of
who should initially devise the procedures, courts or legislatures, may be
answered differently in different states, and the content of those procedures is
likely to be hotly contested in every state. We are impressed by the proposal
made by Professor James Ellis, architect of and Supreme Court advocate in
Atkins, which is laid out in the accompanying footnote,' but think
228. Id. at 56-59.
229. Id. at 59-63.
230. Id. at 44.
231. Ellis recommends the following statutory language to govern trial procedures:
ALTERNATIVE A: If defense counsel has a good faith belief that the
defendant in a capital case has mental retardation, counsel shall file a motion
with the court, requesting a finding that the defendant is not death-eligible
because of mental retardation. Such a motion shall be filed within [time
period] after the prosecution files notice of intent to seek the death penalty,
unless the information in support of the motion came to counsel's attention
at a later date.
Upon receipt of such a motion, the trial court shall conduct a hearing
for the presentation of evidence regarding the defendant's possible mental
retardation. Both the defense and the prosecution shall have the opportunity
to present evidence, including expert testimony. After considering the
evidence, the court shall find the defendant to be not death-eligible if it
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant has mental
retardation. If the defendant is not death-eligible because of mental
retardation, the trial may proceed as a non-capital trial, and, if convicted, the
defendant may be sentenced to any penalty available under state law, other
than death.
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that it is foolish to propose procedures determining the categorical exclusion
of some subgroup of mentally ill offenders before those procedures are
established for determining mental retardation. In short, we would expect to
borrow procedures from those that prevail in the mental retardation area,
making modifications where appropriate.232
If the court finds that defendant is death-eligible, the case may proceed
as a capital trial. The jury shall not be informed of the prior proceedings or
the judge's findings concerning the defendant's claim of mental retardation.
If the capital trial results in a verdict of guilty to a capital charge, the
parties shall be entitled to present evidence to the jury on the issue of
whether the defendant has mental retardation. Having heard the evidence
and arguments, the jury shall be asked to render a special verdict on the issue
of mental retardation. The special verdict shall ask the jury to answer the
question: "Do you unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant does not have mental retardation?" If the jury answers "yes," the
case shall proceed to a penalty phase under [state statute regarding penalty
phase of capital trials]. If the jury answers the question "no," defendant may
be sentenced to any penalty available under state law, other than death.
ALTERNATIVE B: If defense counsel has a good faith belief that the
defendant in a capital case has mental retardation, counsel shall file a motion
with the court, requesting a finding that the defendant is not death-eligible
because of mental retardation. Such a motion shall be filed at least [time
period] prior to the date for trial, unless the information in support of the
motion came to counsel's attention at a later date.
Upon receipt of such a motion, the trial court shall conduct a hearing
for the presentation of evidence regarding the defendant's possible mental
retardation. The hearing shall be conducted before a jury, which shall be
specially empanelled for this issue only. Both the defense and the
prosecution shall have the opportunity to present evidence, including expert
testimony. After considering the evidence, the jury shall be asked, by special
verdict, "Do you unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant does not have mental retardation?" If the jury finds, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant does not have mental retardation, the
case may be certified for a capital trial. Such a trial shall be conducted
before a separate jury. The trial jury shall not be informed of the prior
proceedings or the findings concerning the defendant's claim of mental
retardation, and the defendant shall not be precluded from offering evidence
of the defendant's mental disability in the guilt/innocence phase or the
penalty phase of the trial.
If the defendant is not eligible for the death penalty because of mental
retardation, the trial may proceed as a non-capital trial, and, if convicted, the
defendant may be sentenced to any penalty available under state law, other
than death.
James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues
(2002), at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/MREllisLeg.pdf (Sept. 3, 2003). The paper explores both
the reasons supporting these procedures and the supplementary procedures that should govern
post-conviction and clemency proceedings involving mentally retarded death row inmates.
232. A simpler alternative, given the definition of the exempt category we ultimately pro-
pose, may be to borrow procedures from the states that currently exempt the same group of
offenders from all criminal liability through their insanity defenses; the question with such
procedures is only where in the process to place them.
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This decision to put aside the question of procedure is not, we hasten to
say, motivated by a belief that the question of procedures is unimportant.
Indeed, we think most of the extremely mentally ill offenders on death row
are there because they lost the factual dispute about the severity and effects
of their illness;233 far fewer are there because they lost a legal/moral dispute
about the propriety of a death sentence for a person whose crime actually was
caused by severe mental illness. (In that respect too, Jamie Wilson is an
outlier, for he clearly won the factual dispute and nonetheless was sentenced
to death.) We agree that establishing appropriate procedures to accurately
determine membership in the categorical exemption, however it is defined, is
crucial, but we think there is no need to reinvent the wheel.
We return then to our main task, defining the group of offenders, beyond
Jamie Wilson, whom Atkins places beyond the reach of the death penalty.
Our success in finding a consensus with regard to the volitionally
incapacitated suggests that the place to look for a definition of serious mental
illness, meaning mental illness that categorically forbids the imposition of the
death penalty, is in the substantive law of criminal responsibility. This is in
part because a consensus is easier to "count" where the definitions are
already in use in a large number of jurisdictions, and in part because at least
some of the competing concerns in assessing moral culpability are already
reflected in the tests that have evolved. We consider them in ascending order
of breadth.
1. The M'Naghten Rule
A consensus certainly can be established against the execution of persons
who by virtue of mental illness do not know right from wrong. Because this
is the strictest insanity test, all states that have any insanity defense at all
would count toward a consensus that persons cannot be executed for conduct
they did not, at the time of the offense, know was wrong. Only four states
have abolished the insanity defense altogether-Kansas, Idaho, Montana, and
Utah2 3 4 -and of these, Montana otherwise precludes the execution of
defendants who were mentally ill at the time of the offense.235 Thus, the
overwhelming majority of states have set their course against the execution
of the insane, have done so for a long time, and are unlikely to alter that
course. Moreover, the moral culpability of such persons is obviously less
than that of the "worst" murderer. The only problem with this formulation is
233. See, e.g., McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2001); Ex Parte Perkins, 808
So. 2d 1143 (Ala. 2001); People v. Lawley, 38 P.3d 461 (Cal. 2002); Corcoran v. State, 774
N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting); Final Order, Provenzano v. State, No. 99-
286CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 1999).
234. IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1999).
235. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-312 (2001).
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its narrowness; given the extremely small size of the Kansas, Utah, and Idaho
death rows, such an extension of Atkins has no likely impact at all.
2. The M'Naghten Rule Plus an Irresistable Impulse Test
The Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of defendants who, by
reason of mental illness, either do not know right from wrong or cannot
control their conduct. This conclusion follows from the analysis of State v.
Wilson detailed in Part IV, combined with the brief but parallel analysis on
M'Naghten offenders sketched in the previous paragraph. Given that Jamie
Wilson is the only offender in the first category, and the death rows in
Kansas, Utah and Idaho are so small, adoption of this formulation, though
thoroughly defensible, is significant for very few offenders. Does Atkins
press us further?
3. The Model Penal Code Rule
The Model Penal Code exonerates the defendant whose mental illness
causes him to lack "substantial capacity" either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law.236 This formulation is the most appealing on the culpability front: by its
terms, it covers all those defendants whose mental illness renders them less
morally responsible for their actions, and categorically less moral culpability
is sufficient reason to refrain from the imposition of the death penalty.
Moreover, both deterrence and retribution rationales are implicated by this
definition. In order to justify a capital sentence as just retribution, executing
the offender must "measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring
that the criminal gets his just deserts." '237 It is hard to see why the harshest
penalty should be inflicted on those whose ability to know right from wrong
is "substantially impaired"; it is equally hard to see why those whose ability
to control their conduct is "substantially impaired" deserve the harshest
penalty.23 Moreover, the death penalty has "'little deterrent force against
defendants who have reduced capacity for considered choice,"
9 and pre-
sumably has less force against those not able to fully appreciate the
wrongfulness of their conduct.
236. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985).
237. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
238. Ellis, supra note 9, at 100-09, makes an extended argument demonstrating the re-
duced moral culpability of those whose ability to control their conduct is impaired, and hence the
lack of a retributive justification for executing such persons. His argument relies in part on the
similarity between involuntary acts and acts performed without volitional control.
239. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Ed-
dings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.1 1(1982)) (emphasis added).
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We are left, however, with the question of whether we can count a
consensus for this more generous "lack of substantial capacity" (or, as it can
also be phrased, a "substantial impairment") standard. With respect to the
right versus wrong prong, we can; with respect to the volitional prong, we
have to say: not yet.
a. Impaired Ability to Distinguish Right from Wrong
In seventeen states, the right versus wrong prong of the insanity defenses
requires only that the defendant lacks "substantial capacity" to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct.24 An additional six states move halfway from
the M'Naghten right versus wrong test toward the Model Penal Code
formulation, substituting "appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct" for the
traditional requirement that he does not "know" right from wrong,24" ' and
Montana exempts defendants who do not "appreciate" the wrongfulness of
their conduct from the application of the death penalty.242
Seven of the seventeen states that clearly exempt those who lack
"substantial capacity" to tell right from wrong through their insanity defenses
(and four of the five that exempt those unable to "appreciate" the
wrongfulness of their conduct) do not presently have a death penalty.
Nevertheless, just as was the case with respect to the volitional prong of the
insanity defense, the abolitionist states contribute equally to the legislative
consensus that the death penalty may not be imposed upon those who lack"substantial capacity" to recognize the wrongfulness of their conduct.243
Again, it is not their prohibition of the death penalty, but their recognition of
240. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401 (2001);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-400 (Michie 1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 516-2 (West 2002);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.020 (Michie 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39(1) (West
1983); MD. CODE ANN., C.P. § 3-109(a) (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.2 la (West 2000);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12 .1-04-04(1)(a) (1997); OR.
REv. STAT. § 161.295(1) (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801(a)(1) (1998) ("lacks adequate
capacity... to appreciate the criminality of his conduct"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (1) (West
1998); WvO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-304(a) (Michie 2003); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 663 N.E.2d
559, 562-63 (Mass. 1996); State v. Cegelis, 638 A.2d 783, 785-86 (N.H. 1994) (finding crime
must be the "product" of mental illness); State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 476 (R.I. 1979).
241. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1(a) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (Michie 1997); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6 (Michie 1998); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.086(1) (West 1999); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-11-501(a) (1997); State v. Myers, 222 S.E.2d 300, 305 (W.Va. 1976).
242. Upon a finding that the defendant lacked the ability to "appreciate the criminality of
[his] behavior," MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-311 (2001), "the court shall sentence [him] to be
committed to the custody of the director of the department of public health and human services
to be placed ... in an appropriate ... [institution] for custody, care, and treatment for a definite
period of time not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed [upon a
finding that the defendant did not suffer from such a mental disease or defect]." Id. at § 46-14-312.
243. Coincidentally, both the total number and the death penalty versus abolitionist state
split is exactly the same as it is with respect to the recognition of a volitional prong to the insanity
defense, but the identity of the states is different.
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the radically lesser culpability of nonvolitional actors that contributes to this
consensus. If any of these seven states were to enact a death penalty
tomorrow, persons whose mental illness robs them of "substantial capacity"
to tell right from wrong would be ineligible for death sentencing for precisely
the same reason they are presently ineligible in the ten "substantial capacity"
right versus wrong death penalty states: because such persons are deemed
undeserving of any criminal sanction at all.
Moreover, as we noted with respect to volitional incapacity, at least six
additional states-Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, Ohio, and
Nevada-use proportionality review to remove mentally ill offenders from
the ranks of the condemned despite the apparent availability of capital
punishment in such cases.244 While these proportionality decisions do not
correspond precisely to the "lack substantial capacity to appreciate
wrongfulness" standard (just as they do not match with the "irresistible
impulse" category at issue in Jamie Wilson's case), they sweep in some
offenders less impaired than those who lack "substantial capacity to
appreciate wrongfulness," and therefore contribute additional support for a
conclusion of an evolving standard of decency that prohibits execution of
those whose mental illness substantially impairs their ability to distinguish
right from wrong.
And again, as we noted with respect to volitional incapacity, despite the
Supreme Court's rejection of the notion that states without a death penalty
contribute any information to the question of evolving consensus on the
eligibility of particular classes of offenders,
245 we observe that in five more
244. See, e.g., State v. Fierro, 804 P.2d 72, 90 (Ariz. 1990) (holding death penalty to be
disproportionate due in part to defendant's "history of psychological illness"); State v. Jimenez,
799 P.2d 785, 797-801 (Ariz. 1990) (reducing death sentence to life imprisonment based on
defendant's mental incapacity); State v. Doss, 568 P.2d 1054, 1061 (Ariz. 1977) (same); Besaraba
v. State, 656 So. 2d 441, 447 (Fla. 1995) (overturning death sentence where defendant was under
the influence of great emotional disturbance); Knowles v. State, 632 So. 2d 62, 67 (Fla. 1993)
(finding mitigating factors of defendant's mental illness, including his impaired capacity to control
his conduct, outweighed aggravating factors); Huckaby v. State, 343 So. 2d 29, 33-34 (Fla. 1977)
(finding evidence of mental illness outweighed evidence in aggravation and required reduction of
sentence from death to life imprisonment; "while [defendant] may have comprehended the
difference between right and wrong his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and
to conform it to the law was substantially impaired."); Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla.
1977) (same); Jones v. State, 332 So. 2d 615, 619 (Fla. 1976) (reducing death sentence to life
based on evidence of defendant's mental illness); Evans v. State, 598 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind. 1992)
(finding where defendant produced uncontradicted evidence of psychiatric disorder and parental
neglect, death penalty inappropriate despite aggravated nature of crime and defendant's prior
violent history); Edwards v. State, 441 So. 2d 84, 92-94 (Miss. 1983) (plurality opinion) (vacating
death sentence based on offender's mental illness); Haynes v. State, 739 P.2d 497, 503 (Nev.
1987) (vacating as disproportionate death sentence imposed on mentally ill offender); State v.
Claytor, 574 N.E.2d 472, 482 (Ohio 1991) (finding where defendant produced unrebutted evi-
dence that he lacked substantial capacity to conform, impact of that mitigating factor should have
been given more weight and a life sentence imposed).
245. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.2 (1989) (stating that abolitionist states
reveal nothing about the proportionality of executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds).
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states a person lacking "substantial capacity" to tell right from wrong could
not face the death penalty because there is no death penalty to face. Thus,
with respect to impaired capacity to appreciate wrongfulness, the Eighth
Amendment calculus very much resembles that for volitional incapacity, and
we conclude that it commands a categorical exemption for both.
b. Impaired Volitional Capacity
With respect to impaired volitional capacity, however, substantially
fewer states can be counted in the categorical exemption column. The Note
that addresses the imposition of the death penalty on GBMI offenders
concludes that all volitionally impaired offenders should be exempt, but it
relies solely on a culpability analysis, and specifically abjures any measuring
of consensus or evolving standards. 2" While we agree with the culpability
argument, we read the whole of recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to
compel some kind of measuring. So we count, and by our count only twelve
states recognize substantially impaired volitional control as a bar to criminal
responsibility,247 and hence, the imposition of the death penalty. Looking to
the lesson of precedent, the magic number seems to be between the eighteen
of Atkins that was enough and the fifteen of Stanford that was not; our count
therefore leaves us unable to fird, at least at this time, an Eighth Amendment
violation in the imposition of the death penalty for volitionally impaired
mentally ill offenders.
We are left with a curious hybrid: The Eighth Amendment precludes the
imposition of a death sentence on a defendant whose mental illness either (1)
substantially impaired his capacity to tell right from wrong, or (2) deprived
him of sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
Curious, but not inexplicable; both psychiatry and the law have worked
much longer with the effects mental illness has on the ability to tell right
from wrong than they have with its impact on volition, so we might expect to
be further toward consensus on the former. It is not only problems of proof
that cause hesitation, but those of understanding what it means to be
volitionally impaired. Therefore, with respect to impaired volitional capacity,
we seem to be closer to where we were with respect to mental retardation
when Penry was decided: not to the destination, but on the road.
246. See Ellis, supra note 9, at 109-12.
247. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-13 (2001); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-400 (Michie 1999);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.020 (Michie 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-109(a) (2001);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.21 a (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295(1) (2001); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 4801(a)(1) (1998) ("lacks adequate capacity... to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(1) (West 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-304(a) (Michie
2003); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 663 N.E.2d 559, 562-63 (Mass. 1996); State v. Cegelis, 638
A.2d 783, 785-86 (N.H. 1994) (finding crime must be the "product" of mental illness); State v.
Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 476 (R.I. 1979).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Sometimes the worst are the friends of the bad: because we can see that
mentally normal murderers are worse than mentally retarded or mentally ill
murderers, we hesitate to execute those with mental impairments of either
kind. The Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement broadly embodies
this sentiment.
But at other times, the best is the enemy of the good. Reading the Atkins
opinion, both the abolitionist and the advocate for the mentally ill are likely
to be filled with hope that mental illness is the next categorical exemption.
That hope is fine, but if it stands inviolate in its scope, it is also likely to be
unrealized. It seems to us that all mental illness, or at least all major mental
illnesses, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or even substance abuse
disorders, diminish culpability in a significant way. Persons with such
diminished capacity ought not be eligible for the death penalty, and with
respect to statutory reform, major mental illness is the standard we think
legislatures ought to adopt for categorical exemption.
On the constitutional front, however, we come to a different conclusion:
Rather than follow our own personal predilections, we have followed the
reasoning of the Court, choosing thereby to lend our efforts to support a good
result, instead of squandering them in a purist pursuit of the best outcome.
Looked at more broadly, this instrumentalist approach is the necessary if sad
response of most capital defense lawyers in the post-Furman era. One lesson
of Atkins is that the reward-sometimes-is incremental change.
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